

**Rwanda Second Emergency  
Demobilisation and Reintegration Project  
(SEDRP – P112712)**

**Independent External Evaluation**

**November 11<sup>th</sup> 2015**

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AF	Armed Force
AG	Armed Group
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CBR	Community Based Reintegration
CCI	Cross Cutting Issue
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EA	Environmental Assessment
EDRP	Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
ERM	Environmental Risk Management
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FDG	Focus Group Discussion
FMFA	Financial Management Framework Agreement
FARG	Fund for the Support of Genocide Survivors
FPP	Final Project Proposal
GoR	Government of Rwanda
HQ	Head Quarters
IA	Implementing Agency
IGA	Income Generating Activities
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPP	Initial Project Proposal
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
KII	Key Informant Interview
LODA	Local Administrative Entities Development Agency
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIC	Middle Income Country
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government (Rwanda)
MIS	Management Information System
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NCPD	National Council for Persons with Disabilities
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OP/BP	Operational Policy / Bank Procedures
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PMU	Project Management Unit
PNDDR	Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégration
RDF	Rwandan Defense Force
RDRRC	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
RDRP	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
RFQ	Request for Quotations
SC	Steering Committee
SEDRP	Second Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
SPIP	Social Protection Implementation in Planning

SSR	Security Sector Reform
TA	Technical Assistance
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
TL	Team Leader
TOR	Terms of Reference
TT	Task Team
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNMISS	United Nations Mission to South Sudan
VOIP	Voice Over Internet Protocol
WB	World Bank

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# I Executive Summary

## I.1 Project Background

1. During the period under review for this evaluation, the Project has evolved in a complex context. This context consists of the following: (i) the political economy and country context which is marked by a successful ‘reaping of the post-conflict dividend’<sup>1</sup>; (ii) the programme context, principally the largely successful implementation of the EDRP and SEDRP up to the period of the second AF; (iii) the presence of FDLR ex-combatants and their dependents in DRC. During the implementation of the independent evaluation, due to the conflict in neighbouring Burundi the flow of displaced people into Rwanda was approximately 105,000 people at the time of writing (May 2015).

2. Regarding the performance of the project, arguably the crucial point to be noted from the evolution of the political economy (also identified as the framework conditions) of Rwanda over the lifetime of the project is straightforward but critical to understanding much of the success of the project in economically reintegrating ex-combatants from Rwandan Armed Groups (AGs). Rwanda’s remarkable economic growth and its progress in poverty reduction and social inclusion creates a strong pull for ex-combatants into the labour market and towards a nascent social safety net. The positive framework conditions have meant that economically, ex-combatants have on the whole been absorbed into the labour market (to different extents depending on the classification of ex-combatant)<sup>2</sup> and the positive social environment of reconciliation post-genocide (something which is not without significant challenges) appears to have ensured that ex-combatants of Armed Forces (AF) and AG have socially reintegrated.<sup>3</sup>

3. In summary and according to data provided by the RDRC, the breakdown of direct project beneficiaries between January 2009 and end of Q1 2015 is as follows: 8251 male ex-combatants and 29 female ex-combatants. This represents the number of ex-combatants who have been processed through the SEDRP since 2009. By June 2014 (most recent ISR made available to the evaluation) the project had benefited 7321 dependents who had received resettlement kits.

4. Regarding the stabilization of Rwanda, it is clear the project has consolidated the results of the RDRP and the SEDRP (since 2009). It has facilitated the successful completion of DDR for the RDF to the point where currently Security Sector Reform (SSR) of the RDF is managed through a process separate from the national DDR programme. From the perspective of some donors and key informants, the demobilization of the RDF should have always been a separate SSR process, not one managed through DDR including through the SEDRP (not just RDRP). However, the planned-for outcome of completing the DDR of the remaining cohort of RDF ex-combatants has been achieved within the envisaged project timeframe.

## I.2 Methodology

5. The evaluation used a standard methodology of: (i) comprehensive document review; (ii) qualitative key informant interviews (KIIs); (iii) qualitative focus group discussions with community members and ex-combatants (FGDs), (iv) ongoing data triangulation with emerging

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<sup>1</sup> World Bank

<sup>2</sup> Finn, 2015; Finn et al, 2012.

<sup>3</sup> Finn, 2015 and 2015 (a)

reporting from the RDRC, the World Bank and the others involved in implementation or on the margins of the project.

6. This independent evaluation of the Project was conducted April and May 2015 concurrent with the data validation and analysis from the 2015 Tracer Study, Community Dynamics Study (CDS) and Payment Verification Study (PVS). Analysis from the Tracer, CDS and PVS informed the field work and the analysis contained in this report. The evaluation included a comprehensive review of Project documentation, datasets and outputs, 40 consultations with 39 individuals and field missions to Rubavu, Musanze and Kayonza. Between them the Tracer, CDS and PVS produced 1,991 quantitative surveys, 28 FGDs with between 8 and 10 people per group (approximately 224 individuals) and 9 KIIs.

7. Overall the batch of studies for the RDRC encountered limitations with each study (Tracer, CDS and PVS) separately documenting these limitations, their impact on data and analysis and how the limitations were managed. *Specific* to the evaluation the following were the main challenges:

- (a) Availability of data. Simply put the evaluation did not manage to source some documentation to elaborate or support the analysis in the study. Specific areas have been noted in the report but the main impact has been in calculating cost per beneficiary and rating project efficiency.
- (b) Availability of some key informants, mainly in government ministries including MoD.

### **I.3 Findings of the 2015 Independent Evaluation**

8. The independent evaluation presents 24 findings and 6 recommendations. This represents the full findings and recommendations of the study.

9. **Finding 1.** The evaluation finds that the project is likely to achieve its PDO by the proposed close of the project in June 2016 (at the time of revising the evaluation report this is extended to December 2017). At the time of evaluation the project has supported the GoR to demobilise members of AGs of Rwandan origin and members for the RDF to the extent that the RDF cohort has been completed. The project has supported the GoR to provide a wide variety of socio-economic reintegration support to demobilised ex-combatants and their dependants and has supported the GoR to focus on female, children and disabled ex-combatants (although the numbers of female ex-combatants are very low and the numbers of former child combatants are limited). These two factors are outside the control of the project.

10. **Finding 2.** The evaluation finds that the project has successfully supported 75.5 percent of ex-combatants to become economically active (compared to 77.4 percent of civilians). As per the Results Framework the Target for 2014 was 70 percent.

11. **Finding 3.** The evaluation finds that the project has failed to meet the Results Framework target of 70 percent of ex-combatants reporting social acceptance however given a 10 percent margin of error the project is likely to be performing satisfactorily in this regard. In total 64.3 percent of ex-combatants (69.9 percent ex-AF and 59.5 percent ex-AG) report that they feel accepted in their immediate community. Of disabled ex-combatants 60.8 percent report they feel accepted and of former child combatants also 60.8 percent report they are accepted. No gender analysis was possible in the CDS due to low frequency of female respondents (n5 to this question). This compares to 44.1 percent of civilians who feel socially accepted.

12. **Finding 4.** The evaluation finds that the project has met the 2014/2015 target to ensure that a minimum of 80 percent of ex-combatants are satisfied with services and information provided in demobilisation centres. This finding is based on multiple variables in the 2015 PVS, not on a single variable asking whether or not ex-combatants were satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilisation centres. Specifically of the entire PVS sample, approximately three-quarters of the sample feel that key services at the demobilisation service do not require any improvements. This shows a level of satisfaction with the services at the demobilisation centre. It was found that 62.8 percent of the PVS sample feel that the medical care does not need improvements; 71.2 percent feel the psychological counseling does not need improvements; 69.7 percent feel the Career guidance does not need improvements; and 72.2 percent feel that the reproductive or sexual health care services do not need improvements.
13. **Finding 5.** The evaluation finds that 97.8 percent of self-identified eligible ex-combatants indicated they had received the BNK and 94 percent of those who received it indicated they had done so prior to leaving the demobilization centre. In total, 91.3 percent of self-identified eligible ex-combatants indicated they had received RSA of which 87.7 percent indicated they had done so within three months of reinsertion into the community of return.<sup>4</sup> As per the Results Framework the Target for 2014 was 95 percent.
14. **Finding 6.** The evaluation finds that based on PVS data the project has delivered reinsertion kits to 95.9 percent of the eligible dependents of ex-combatants.<sup>5</sup> There is no target in the Results Framework.
15. **Finding 7.** The evaluation finds that based on PVS data, 95.9 percent of ex-combatants freely chose their community of reinsertion.<sup>6</sup> As per the Results Framework the Target for 2014 was 95 percent.
16. **Finding 8.** The evaluation finds that in total, 77.6 percent of ex-combatants were screened for mental health issues. Of the cohort of former child ex-combatants, 77.0 percent were screened for mental health issues. While not included as part of the Results Framework target it is useful to see that when analysed further the data presents that during the recently introduced mini-PDOP 31.6 percent of ex-combatants indicate that their dependants were screened for mental health issues (40.5 percent for medical issues) and 34.2 percent that specifically their children were screened.
17. **Finding 9.** The evaluation finds that regarding access to *Mutuelles de Santé* for disabled ex-combatants the project has failed to reach the 2015 target of 95 percent. As per the 2015 PVS the evaluation finds that of the cohort of disabled ex-combatants, 75.9 percent have *Mutuelles de Sante*. All disabled ex-combatants in the PVS were Category 1 to 4 and the following is the breakout of category and possession of *Mutuelles de Santé*: *Category 1 (100.0 percent); Category 2 (70.6 percent); Category 3 (70.0 percent) and Category 4 (81.5 percent)*. Of the same overall cohort 72.7 percent received their Monthly Allowance within the 9 month timeframe.
18. **Finding 10.** The evaluation does not deliver a finding for the target regarding the receipt of a national identity number. This is because of an avoidable limitation in the PVS survey where

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<sup>4</sup> Source: PVS 2015.

<sup>5</sup> Baxter and Finn, 2015.

<sup>6</sup> Baxter and Finn, 2015.

the data for receipt of national identity number was phrased as ‘identity cards’. However, based on data supplied directly by the RDRC the following (238) received the numbers:<sup>7</sup>

- (a) Phase 50: 30
- (b) Phase 51: 46
- (c) Phase 52: 34
- (d) Phase 53: 54
- (e) Phase 54: 64
- (f) Phase 55: 10

19. **Finding 11.** The evaluation finds that the following factors (discussed in detail in the body of the report) have **positively** affected the project outcomes:

- (a) Generally positive country context, particularly economic growth and poverty reduction;
- (b) Alignment of the project with the social inclusion priorities of the GoR and institutionally under MINALOC particularly concerning mainstreaming (by design) of project activities;
- (c) Buy-in from the GoR (financial and regarding sustainability);
- (d) Policy alignment with key social policies particularly gender and disability;
- (e) Comprehensive communications strategy including with MONUSCO;
- (f) Flexibility to allow reaction to opportunities to improve services to returning ex-AGs and their dependents particularly through the mini-PDOP and attempts to expand the coverage of mental health screening and through the work of the MRU.

20. **Finding 12.** The evaluation finds that the following factors (discussed in detail in the body of the report) have **negatively** affected the project outcomes:

- (a) Broad set of external factors mitigating against the planned-for and prioritised return of ex-AGs from DRC;
- (b) Lack of opportunity to realise key policies through implementation, particularly gender mainstreaming;
- (c) Limitations either through human capacity or other factors on services provided to some vulnerable groups particularly former child ex-combatants including as a result of staff churn, staff capacity and the reassignment of staff roles in the RDRC;
- (d) Challenges regarding M&E, information centralisation and collation particularly concerning the demographic data of ex-combatants and the performance of the MRU;
- (e) Challenges regarding monitoring and implementation in a context of scaling down DDR programming and scaling up social protection programming: in other words the problem of the question where does DDR end and social inclusion begin?

21. **Finding 13.** The evaluation finds that the project has benefited from GoR commitment in the form of counterpart financing of activities, entering into lending agreement for the current AF and through the underwriting of the continuation of the RDRC post-SEDRP thus increasing the

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<sup>7</sup> Electronic Communication from RDRC October 30<sup>th</sup> 2015.

likelihood that impact from the SEDRP will be consolidated and that missed opportunities or poor programming will be corrected.

22. **Finding 14.** The evaluation finds that it is highly likely that the continued trickle-in is facilitated by the project's communications activities that are driven by the current strategy and delivered partially in partnership with MONUSCO. The communications strategy is innovative and builds on the traditional approach of utilising radio programming (in the case of the SEDRP via weekly Radio Rwanda broadcasts, quarterly interactive radio talk shows and affiliated broadcasts into DRC) and facilitated peer-to-peer telephone communications (with dedicated handsets for Mutobo and Muhoza) and VOIP services via Skype that are made available to FDLR in DRC through a laptop computer hosted in markets frequented by FDLR. While the efficacy of the strategy is not reviewed in depth it would be worthwhile including a focus on communications in future quantitative surveying by or for the RDRC's annual Tracer and PVS.

23. **Finding 15.** The evaluation praises the work of the MRU but finds that in general the MRU appears to lack effective record keeping, communications and follow-up systems including regarding those patients that have been mainstreamed. Staffing at the unit is limited (1 x medical doctor/psychiatrist, 4 x psychologists and 3 x medical nurses) and they must work across Muhoza and Mutobo on often complex cases. Challenges such as staff burnout and provision of appropriate supports (such as peer supervision) are clearly evident and should be a concern to the RDRC if it wishes the MRU is to be effective in the future.

24. **Finding 16.** The evaluation finds that regarding gender, the RDRC has reported that it has completed a Gender Action Plan and a Tracer Gender Assessment in Kigali.<sup>8</sup> The project has a gendered approach to work with male ex-combatants during the PDOP and through its psychosocial component with counselling to support gender equality. That said, despite these measures and having a policy focus on gender mainstreaming as it is defined by MIGEPROF (a definition which emphasises gender equality and access to opportunities and services) the project does not have a sufficient cohort of female ex-combatants to fully realise its ambitions for gender mainstreaming. In so far as gender applies to males there is some recognition of this dynamic but it is not evident how the findings of, for example, the Promundo International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES)<sup>9</sup> relating to perceptions of the concept of mutual consent, the links between psychotraumatic stress, substance misuse and gender-base violence (GBV) or the adaptation of male identities during the reintegration process really inform the project.

25. **Finding 17.** The evaluation finds that the project has been intended to have a specific focus on pre-determined vulnerable groups (female, child and disabled ex-combatants). However, it is in two of these sub-groups that the project appears to have the most challenges.<sup>10</sup> These challenges appear to originate in a variety of factors including: lack of beneficiaries (female ex-combatants) and unclear staff capacity including through the knock-on effects of staff churn or reassignment (former child combatants). It is challenging for the evaluation to definitively pin-down the issues at play and the RDRC clearly does not feel staff churn or reassignment is a problem. That said some lessons from the field are clear. As seen above the cohort of females in the project is very small and as such it is difficult for the project to deliver a special focus on females unless it devises a means to better assess the social and economic performance of female

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<sup>8</sup> Not shared with the evaluation.

<sup>9</sup> LOGiCA, 2014.

<sup>10</sup> World Bank 2009, 2014.

ex-combatants and/or female dependents with a view to devising concrete programming interventions. In general, current tools for assessing the success or otherwise of the reintegration of female ex-combatants (Tracer and CDS) are inadequate given the challenge of accessing the population. In the 2015 studies while the CDS has an adequate proportion of female ex-combatants the other studies simply do not. A more nuanced approach is required, one which is likely to be qualitative in methodology to examine the social and economic situation of female ex-combatants and female dependents over an extended period of time (minimum 12 to 18 months).

26. **Finding 18.** Regarding project preparation and design and quality at entry the evaluation rates both as satisfactory. They were responsive to the GoR policy frameworks at the time of the project became effective (2009) and at the time of the first and second AFs. Specifically, the original project aligned with the priorities of EDPRS-1 particularly in the areas of social protection where EDPRS-1 planned: (i) to extend coverage of vulnerable persons by social safety nets from 12 percent to 20 percent (ii) to ensure that 38 percent of vulnerable people graduating from livelihood enhancement schemes achieve economic independence, (iii) to ensure that *mutuelles de santé* cover extends to all target groups.<sup>11</sup>

27. **Finding 19.** The evaluation rates the relevance of the project objectives as **high**. Similarly the relevance of project design is rated **high**. The project's objectives and design have been relevant to: (i) EDPRS and EDPRS 2; (ii) GoR's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) and Social Protection Implementation Planning (SPIP); (iii) GoR responsibilities under the Arusha Accords; (iv) the recurring needs of ex-combatants and their families in the context of time-limited DDR programming; (v) national ownership as a pillar of DDR, and (vi) the Bank 2002 – 2006 CAS and current 2014 – 2018 CPS.

28. **Finding 20.** The evaluation rates the project effectiveness in progress made towards achieving its PDO as **substantial** because (i) the project has met the presented demand for demobilization; (ii) has performed satisfactorily in the timely and accurate provision of most reinsertion and reintegration supports, (iii) the project's planned for outputs based on the mass return of ex-AGs from DRC were not realised mainly due to return being a trickle-in, (iv) efficiency and quality challenges with project's M&E, and (v) based on lower rates of disbursement of essential items or delays experienced by ex-combatants as identified above and in the 2014 PVS.

29. **Finding 21.** The evaluation rates the project efficacy as **substantial** because: (i) the project has supported the GoR via the RDRC to demobilize all eligible RDF; (ii) the project has supported the GoR to demobilize some members of AGs of Rwandan origin however a number estimated at between 2000 and 3000 combatants and their dependents remain in DRC; (iii) the project successfully provided economic reintegration supports to 4,000 RDF and 4,280 ex-AG and their dependents in the period under evaluation, and (iv) the project has had a particular focus on disabled ex-combatants including through partnering GoR financing of residential housing and Integrated Rehabilitation Workshops, and (v) the project has had a focus on former child ex-combatants through the provision of services aligned with the IDDRS standard practice of DDR for youth but it has not adequately followed up on former child ex-combatants (socially or economically).

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<sup>11</sup> GoR, 2008: 42.

30. **Finding 22.** The evaluation rates the sustainability of the project as **substantial** because: (i) the GoR has committed in legislation to continue the work of the RDRC post-SEDRP; (ii) successive Tracer and CDS studies have returned a positive picture for the reintegration of ex-combatants indicating that the positive impact of the project is stable and the most recent assessment shows ex-combatants performing well economically and socially; (iii) the project strongly aligns with other GoR social protection policy and programming; (iv) while the GoR has committed to continue the work of the RDRC at the time of evaluation it is not clear what this means for the continuation of activities from the SEDRP or the focus of the project: a work-plan has not been created by the RDRC as of yet; (v) the highly uncertain external environment principally, (vi) continuing conflict in DRC and the failure of MONUSCO to tackle the FDLR; (vii) possible social and political ‘contagion’ from the breakdown in order and attempted coup in Burundi; (viii) the underlying tension in Rwanda regarding a possible constitutional amendment and extension of the presidential term.

31. **Finding 23.** The evaluation rates the risk to development outcomes as **moderate**. The risks to PDO for the SEDRP are all largely external to the project at country and regional level and emanating from the political economy of Rwanda and its neighbours. At the time of evaluation the project has achieved one half of its PDO in the demobilisation of members of RDF. Regarding the other half of the PDO it continues to support the GoR to provide socio-economic reintegration support to ex-combatants who have demobilized recently (and not so recently in the case of on-going interventions with elderly, disabled or unwell). As has been discussed, the results for the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants are strong and drivers of destabilization such as poverty, stigma and inequality are unlikely to originate from within communities of return.

### **I.3 Recommendations**

32. **Recommendation 1.** The evaluation recommends that given the examination of the achievements of the project to date and the risk to project outcomes, the project should continue on its current path with some adjustment to address outstanding issues in particular those pertaining to ex-combatants in acute deprivation, the needs and appropriateness of engagement with former child combatants, and the functionality and capacity of the MRU.

33. **Recommendation 2.** The evaluation notes findings from the Tracer identifying a cohort of ex-combatants enduring acute deprivation (approximately 15.0 percent of all ex-combatants). Given the RDRC is in receipt of the data from 2015 it can further investigate the life circumstances of this cohort. As the 2015 Tracer concluded, year on year there has been a significant increase in those apparently trapped in acute deprivation and thus unable to work their way out into a successful income generating projects. This should be a priority for the RDRC.

34. **Recommendation 3.** The evaluation notes the value both RDRC and MINALOC places on the RDRC as part of the social protection architecture in Rwanda. As is tracked throughout the 2014 CDS, disabled civilians are consistently worse off both economically and socially than their ex-combatant counterparts. The evaluation notes that this represents an ideal opportunity for the RDRC to share its successes working with disabled ex-combatants with a view to mainstreaming comparable supports in other agencies for civilians with disabilities and encourages the RDRC to do so.

35. **Recommendation 4.** The evaluation discusses how former child combatants sub-group of returned ex-combatants largely goes without systematic follow-up by the project or by other

agencies in the arena such as the ICRC. It is clear that the project vis-à-vis the RDRC is struggling with how and for how long to engage former child ex-combatants. Effectively the RDRC is struggling with implementing a solid follow-up mechanism and is struggling with deciding what supports (in addition to those already provided through the SEDRP) would benefit former child soldiers, with an understanding of how to support former child soldiers (as crystallised in the current pilot mentorship programme), and for how long. Simply the evaluation recommends the RDRC formally consults with child combatants to identify the kinds of post-programme support they need and for how long they believe it is appropriate and productive for the RDRC to stay engaged.

36. There are few knowledge resources on the intensely local or personal situation of former child combatants in Rwanda to guide the project and therefore, other than the assumption that former child soldiers are a vulnerable group and the interventions derived from standard DDR programming there is little framework for engagement. In other locations where longitudinal studies have been conducted it has been found that former child soldiers successfully reintegrate economically and socially but carry the “psychological distress” of their experiences as a combatant leading them to lead more solitary lives and deal with symptoms of psychological disorders themselves.<sup>12</sup> Thus skilling the MRU, community health animators and mainstream mental health service providers to better target former child combatants could be a starting point for better supports to this cohort of ex-combatants.

37. Also, it is worthwhile noting that while the caseload of arriving ex-AG is low, the whole purpose of health animators is to assist in the detection and referral of mental health issues with ex-combatants who are reintegrated in the community. What is clear is that within the community there can be very little knowledge of how to deal with mental health challenges including PTSD. For example, when family members of ex-AF and ex-AG were asked how they helped the ex-combatant deal with their psychological issues the majority only ‘listened to her/him’ (49.6 percent) or prayed for her/him (38.1 percent). Only 1.8 percent brought the ex-combatant to a hospital and only 1.8 percent brought them to an NGO for help.<sup>13</sup> Clearly much is going undetected and there is room for better sensitisation and detection in the community.

38. **Recommendation 5.** The evaluation recommends that while mainstreaming is moving ahead, the RDRC finalises its outstanding workplan and budgeting for 2016 and 2017. Not only is GoR finance dependent on an approved workplan it is worthwhile sharing with exiting donors the aspects of the project that will be continued (subject to financing) post-SEDRP to gauge interest in them continuing their involvement.

39. In general, through the demobilization and reintegration of ex-AGs and their dependants the project has contributed to the stabilization of Rwanda and to the stabilization efforts in the region, particularly in DRC. That said, the external environment in the DRC is complex and well outside the control of the project and despite the on-going implementation of its own and its joint (with MONUSCO) communications strategy the RDRC can only do so much to influence the situation in DRC. Regardless, the fact that Rwanda remains stable and that the sizeable population of ex-combatants and their dependants (just one but a significant and heterogeneous group of potential ‘spoilers’ of peace and development) has been successfully reintegrated into

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<sup>12</sup> Boothby, 2006.

<sup>13</sup> Specht, 2014: 5

Rwandan society is clearly a major contribution to post-conflict stabilization in the region and in the country.

# 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

## 1.1 Project Context

40. The evaluation addresses the performance of the Project over a 27-month period from January 2013 to March 2015. In order to rate progress towards achieving the PDO data pertaining to the period 2009 to 2015 is cited. Over this period the Project went through three periods of financing:

41. At all times during the project from the original project preparation to the second AF the World Bank has retained a regional focus whereby the demobilization of Rwandan AG combatants is identified as a means of improving regional security and stability and not just the security and stability of Rwanda.

42. During the period under review for this evaluation the project has evolved. This evolution has been driven by a dynamic project context which includes the successes of the EDRP<sup>14</sup>, the challenge presented by the substantial number of FDLR and their dependents that remains in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),<sup>15</sup> and the progress of the SEDRP towards its close in 2016 which has stimulated the design and implementation of a project exit strategy. The evolution of the Project is reflected in changes in the Project Components and in the Results Framework.

43. The project context consists of the following: (i) the political economy and country context which is marked by a successful ‘reaping of the post-conflict dividend’<sup>16</sup>; (ii) the programme context, principally the largely successful implementation of the EDRP and SEDRP up to the period of the second AF; (iii) the presence of FDLR ex-combatants and their dependents in DRC, and (iv) during the implementation of the independent evaluation conflict in neighbouring Burundi and the flow of displaced people into Rwanda which sits at approximately 105,000 people at the time of writing (May 2015).

44. The current (second) AF follows a request from the Government of Rwanda (GoR) to finance costs associated with scaling up the SEDRP to include extended demobilization and reintegration services for predicted incoming ex-combatants from Armed Groups (AGs) from eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The AF was agreed based on the analysis between the GoR and IDA that it would be beneficial to continue demobilization and reintegration (D&R) past the envisaged closing date for SEDRP or June 30th 2016.

45. The political economy of Rwanda has reflected a steady strengthening of the country in its economic performance and in the performance of public institutions. The World Bank has identified that Rwanda has managed a “triple crown of fast economic growth, robust reductions in poverty and a narrowing of inequality”.<sup>17</sup> The World Bank’s own appraisal of material and non-material measures of wellbeing identify that in the last 20 years and particularly the last 10 years Rwanda has “delivered economic growth, [experienced] a significant decline in poverty, and a

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<sup>14</sup> GiZ, 2010; World Bank, 2009.

<sup>15</sup> Throughout the evaluation key informants offered differing appraisals of the size of the FDLR contingent in DRC. Generally they ranged from 2000 to 5000 individuals including dependents. The Bank Project Paper (April 4<sup>th</sup> 2014) estimated 1,200 FDLR remained outside Rwanda.

<sup>16</sup> World Bank

<sup>17</sup> World Bank, 2014 (a): i.

reduction in inequality”.<sup>18</sup> However the World Bank assesses that the “post-conflict dividend” is exhausted and Rwanda is facing the challenge of transitioning to a middle income country (MIC).<sup>19</sup>

46. The African Development Bank strategy sounds a similar note of economic progress but tempers the analysis with the statement that while “wide-ranging reforms have been implemented to include peace and security” and while “institutions have been established and strengthened to foster increased citizen participation and governance” there remains “scope for improvement especially in civil liberties”.<sup>20</sup>

47. The crucial take-away from the evolution of the political economy (also sometimes identified as the ‘framework conditions’) of Rwanda over the lifetime of the project is straightforward but critical to understanding much of the success of the project in economically reintegrating ex-combatants from Rwandan AGs. Rwanda’s remarkable economic growth and its progress in poverty reduction and social inclusion creates a strong pull for ex-combatants into the labour market and towards a nascent social safety net. This sets apart the Rwandan DDR programme from its regional equivalents such as those in DRC<sup>21</sup> and Republic of South Sudan<sup>22</sup> where the absence of an appropriate market for ex-combatants (skilled or unskilled) has stymied economic and social reintegration. DDR is a time-limited programming intervention with the process of socially and economically reintegrating ex-combatants beginning during DDR but continuing for many years after the ex-combatant has left the DDR programme. The positive country conditions have meant that economically, ex-combatants have on the whole been absorbed into the labour market (to different extents depending on the classification of ex-combatant)<sup>23</sup> and the positive social environment of reconciliation post-genocide (something which is not without significant challenges) appears to have ensured that ex-combatants of Armed Forces (AF) and Armed Groups (AG) have socially reintegrated.<sup>24</sup>

## 1.2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators

48. The **PDO** of the original grant (effective June 9<sup>th</sup> 2010) was: “to support the efforts of the Recipient to (i) demobilized members for armed groups of Rwandan origin and members of the Rwandan Defence Forces; and (ii) provide socio-economic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to female, child and disabled ex-combatants”.<sup>25</sup> This PDO remained unchanged for the first and second AF.

49. From the perspective of the RDRC, the PDO formulated during the second AF has the first section framed differently: “demobilize members of Rwandan origin *as they repatriate*, and members for Rwanda Defence Forces [emphasis added]”.<sup>26</sup> This subtle difference in emphasis points to the current position of the RDRC vis-à-vis what was the planned close of the SEDRP in June 2016 (extended to December 2017). The RDRC’s position (and that supported by the GoR

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<sup>18</sup> World Bank, 2014 (a): 1.

<sup>19</sup> World Bank, 2014 (a): 1.

<sup>20</sup> AfDB, 2011: 1 – 2.

<sup>21</sup> World Bank, 2012.

<sup>22</sup> Finn, 2014.

<sup>23</sup> Finn, 2015; Finn et al, 2012.

<sup>24</sup> Finn, 2015 and 2015 (a)

<sup>25</sup> World Bank, 2009: 5.

<sup>26</sup> RDRC, 2015: 7.

via pending legislation (Section 2.4)) is that the RDRC will remain operational in order to meet the current trickle-in and any future trickle-in or mass return of AGs and their dependants as well as to meet the needs presented by new and already returned ex-combatants (within an acceptable DDR programming timeframe. See Sections 2.4 and 4.6). The RDRC expands this point further by identifying the institutional capacity required to ensure the RDRC meets its PDOs:

- (a) Maintain capacity required for repatriation, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of returned members of Armed Groups and their dependents;
- (b) Maintain capacity required for demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of up to 4,000 members of the RDF;
- (c) Maintain capacity required for completion of up to 4,000 members of the RDF;
- (d) Maintain capacity required for completion of reintegration activities for combatants demobilized in late 2008;
- (e) Ensure that ex-combatants (XCs) access mainstream services at the national and local levels.<sup>27</sup>

50. While it could be argued that the institutional capacity identified above is somewhat more than what is currently required (the cohort from 2008 are complete and well outside any traditional timeframe for DDR programming, 4,000 AG have yet to materialize and the programme has demobilized 636 ex-combatants between January 2013 and March 2015) the RDRC emphasises the need to ‘maintain capacity’ for trickle in/mass demobilisation of FDLR as well as to deal with new challenges from within the cohort of already reintegrated ex-combatants should they emerge.

51. At the time of the review of the evaluation report the SEDRP has been given a no cost extension to December 2017.

52. The **expected project results** of the original grant and which remained unchanged for the first and second AF are as follows:

- (a) Increased number of beneficiaries settled in their chosen communities of destination;
- (b) Improved capacity of beneficiaries to advance their own social and economic reintegration;
- (c) Increased access of ex-combatants to support services through central and local government service provision mechanisms (as opposed to through program services<sup>28</sup>).

53. The **expected outputs** of the original grant were as follows:

- (a) The demobilization of up to 5,500 combatants from AGs (depending on demand), including approximately 500 child soldiers, over a period of two years, or sooner, depending on the rate of repatriation. The demobilization of up to 4,000 members of RDF would also be phased over two years.

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<sup>27</sup> RDRC, 2015: 7-8.

<sup>28</sup> World Bank, 2009: 7.

- (b) Each ex-combatant receives a grant of RWF 60,000 on the day of discharge to cover the basic needs. A Recognition-of-Service Allowance (RSA) is given to ex-RDF one month after demobilization, the amount of which will be a function of former rank, from the equivalent of RWF 180,000 for private, rising up to RWF 600,000 for a colonel.
- (c) Each ex-combatant receives support for the financing of a micro-project with a Reintegration Grant (RG) of RWF 120,000 independently of original and rank. The members of the AGs and RDF receive this grant three months after demobilization. All vulnerable ex-combatants (including all female ex-combatants) receive VSW grants in the form of sub-projects for on- and off-farm income generating activities for an average of RWF 180,000.

54. From the perspective of the RDRC, from the second AF the project is intended to have three broad objectives:<sup>29</sup>

- (a) Demobilize an estimated 5,500 members of AGs and 4,000 members of the RDF;
- (b) Provide reinsertion support for these demobilized along with approximately 10,000 family members of ex-AG;
- (c) Provide social and economic reintegration assistance to the newly demobilized as well as up to 400 previous beneficiaries who did not receive support, with emphasis on children and the severely disabled. The Project will also seek to mainstream ex-combatant support services within existing government or stakeholder programs.

55. The Bank **targets** of the original grant were as follows. Where relevant, changes to the targets for the second AF is highlighted<sup>30</sup>:

- (a) PDO-level:
  - i. Number of demobilized RDF members (disaggregated by gender, ill/disabled). This remained unchanged for the second AF. *No target set for second AF in project documentation. Confirmed to be 100 percent.*<sup>31</sup>
  - ii. Number of demobilized AG members (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled). This remained unchanged for the second AF. *No target set for second AF in project documentation. Confirmed to be 100 percent.*<sup>32</sup>
  - iii. Percentage of demand for demobilization services met. This remained unchanged for the second AF. *Target remained unchanged for second AF: 100 percent (2013, 2014 and 2015).*
  - iv. Percentage of ex-combatants who are economically active (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled). *This target was subject to a revised target and gender disaggregation. The target at the time of evaluation is 70 percent (2014 and 2015). Progress was 62 percent in 2013.*
  - v. Percentage of ex-combatants who report social acceptance by their communities (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled). *This target was subject to a revision in order to exclude reporting by children. Reporting by former child-ex-combatants is not affected. The target at the time of*

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<sup>29</sup> RDRC, 2015 (a): 8.

<sup>30</sup> World Bank, 2014: 11-16.

<sup>31</sup> Lemasle (Correspondence), 14<sup>th</sup> June 2015.

<sup>32</sup> Lemasle (Correspondence), 14<sup>th</sup> June 2015.

evaluation is 80 percent (for years 2014 and 2015). Progress was 78 percent in 2013.

- vi. Number of direct project beneficiaries disaggregated by gender. This is identified as 'continued' for the second AF. However, the indicator is not included in the results framework for the original grant. No target is set for second AF.

(b) Component-level. Component 1: **Demobilization**

- i. Percentage of demobilized persons who are satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilization centres. *target remained unchanged for the second AF. The target at the time of evaluation is 80 percent (2014 and 2015). Progress was 96 percent in 2013.*

(c) Component-level. Component 2: **Reinsertion**

- i. Number of ex-combatants who have received reinsertion benefits (BNK, RSA) in time and in accordance with the implementation manual. *target remained unchanged for the second AF. The target at the time of evaluation is 95 percent (2014 and 2015). Progress was 95 percent in 2013.*
- ii. Number of resettlement kits delivered to dependents of ex-AG members. *target remained unchanged for the second AF. No target set.*
- iii. Percentage of ex-combatants who settle down in their community of choice (with access to shelter and food security). *target remained unchanged for the second AF. The target at the time of evaluation is 95 percent (2014 and 2014). Progress was 100 percent in 2013.*

(d) Component-level. Component 3: **Reintegration**

- i. Number of ex-combatants who receive reintegration benefits (RG) in time and in accordance with the implementation manual. *target remained unchanged for the second AF. No target set.*
- ii. Percentage of ex-combatants that have completed the support income generating activity as planned. *target removed for second AF.*
- iii. Percentage of ex-combatants that have successfully completed the agreed training/education plan. *target revised for second AF. Revision is as follows: Percentage of ex-combatants selected to receive VSW support and registered to receive training who have successfully completed training/education. The target at the time of evaluation is 90 percent (2014 and 2015). Progress was 90 percent in 2013.*
- iv. Percentage of affected ex-combatants who have received psychosocial assistance. *target revised for second AF. Revision is as follows: Percentage of incoming ex-combatants who are screened for mental health issues (disaggregated by adult/children). The target at the time of evaluation is 70 percent (2014) and 75 percent (2015). No data for 2013.*

(e) Component-level. Component 4: **Mainstreaming**

- i. Percentage of severely disabled ex-combatants receiving benefits as per current legislation within 9 months of demobilization. *target revised for*

*second AF. Revision is as follows: Percentage of categorized disabled ex-combatants who receive Mutuelle de Sante and Monthly Allowance as per current legislation, within 9 months after demobilization. The target at the time of evaluation is 95 percent (2014 and 2015). Progress was 96 percent for 2013.*

- ii. Percentage of chronically ill ex-combatants mainstreamed into appropriate socio-medical services within 9 months of demobilization. *target removed for second AF.*
- iii. Percentage of ex-combatants having an ID card and medical insurance 6 months after being demobilized. *target revised for second AF. Revision is as follows: Percentage of ex-combatants provided with a national ID registration before they leave the demobilization centre. The target at the time of evaluation is 85 percent (2014) and 90 percent (2015). No data for 2013.*

56. In its assessment of the progress of the Project towards PDO the evaluation has triangulated data provided by the RDRC M&E department, RDRC quarterly reporting, and 2015 Tracer, CDS and PVS data. Further, the evaluation has employed data from 2012 quantitative surveys shared by the RDRC. This 2012 data was not collected, cleaned or verified by the evaluation team.

### **1.3 Intended Main Beneficiaries**

57. During the period under evaluation, the main beneficiaries of the Project are:

- (a) RDF ex-combatants;
- (b) AG ex-combatants (mainly FDLR);
- (c) The dependents of AG ex-combatants.

58. Between 2014 and 2015 there were changes to the project to facilitate direct support to dependents of demobilized ex-combatants. As the quota of RDF ex-combatants had been reached (2013) all direct support to dependents by default has gone to dependents of FDLR. This support includes the following:

- (a) For VSW recipients, the deferral of vocational training to their spouse or nominated dependent. In the period under evaluation approximately 2.0 percent of ex-combatants have chosen this option.<sup>33</sup>
- (b) For the dependents of ex-AG, during the reinsertion process dependents receive a Basic Reinsertion Kit (Basic Needs Kit - BNK). In the period under review, 97.8 percent of eligible ex-combatants have received kits.<sup>34</sup>
- (c) For all dependents of demobilized AG's that return to Rwanda with the ex-combatant they are exposed to a mini-Pre-Discharge Orientation Programme (PDOP). This was introduced in 2014. In the period under evaluation 99.0 percent of ex-combatants have been exposed to the mini-PDOP.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> This proportion (n6) is of the respondents who received VSW support (n285) since 2009. It may not represent the true number of deferrals. Source: 2015 PVS dataset.

<sup>34</sup> Source: 2015 PVS dataset.

<sup>35</sup> Source: 2015 PVS dataset.

#### **1.4 Project Components and Outputs as per Original Grant and Second AF**

59. The original project components are outlined in the Project Documentation and along with Project *outputs* are discussed below. *Outputs* are the direct and measurable products of a program's activities or services.

60. Based on the challenges in compatibility between data presented in quarterly and annual reporting as outlined above (2013) the evaluation relies on annual reporting totals for 2013 and 2014 to provide the data in project outputs. For 2015 totals are taken from quarterly reporting. Where appropriate these figures are cross-referenced with data from the 2015 Tracer, PVS and CDS.

**Project Component: Demobilisation (US\$2,518,654 Original Project (All sources of Financing); US\$2,267,600 Second AF (Estimated Disbursements) Implemented by RDRC with assistance of Ministry of Defence (MoD) and MONUSCO)<sup>36</sup>**

61. Demobilisation is:

the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.<sup>37</sup>

62. For the RDRC, Demobilization is a clear 'case-load orientated' process involving close collaboration with the Ministry of Defense (MoD).<sup>38</sup>

63. For the SEDRP, the Original Project defined the Demobilization component in terms of the desired project outputs and activities. The outputs were: 5,500 AG combatants including 500 child soldiers; 4,000 RDF combatants. Principal activities were identified as: general sensitization and counselling regarding civilian life, HIV/AIDS voluntary counselling and testing (VCT), socio-economic profiling, and support of basic needs while encamped, including catering services and health care.<sup>39</sup>

64. In more detail the objective of the Demobilization component is to "reduce the number of RDF military personnel by 4,000"<sup>40</sup> and to "demobilize all returning members of ex-armed groups on an on-going basis as and when they return to Rwanda".<sup>41</sup> Specifically, for RDF demobilization consists of:<sup>42</sup>

- (a) Logistics (such as RDF returning with equipment); transportation to discharge centres; travel to communities of settlement;

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<sup>36</sup> World Bank, 2009; 2014.

<sup>37</sup> UN, 2005.

<sup>38</sup> RDRC, 2015: 14-15.

<sup>39</sup> World Bank, 2009: 5; 2014: iv.

<sup>40</sup> RDRC, 2015: 14.

<sup>41</sup> RDRC, 2015: 14.

<sup>42</sup> RDRC, 2015: 14 – 15.

- (b) Screening to ensure adherence to demobilization criteria;
- (c) Discharge.

65. For AGs demobilization consists of:<sup>43</sup>

- (a) Disarmament (including separation of child and adult ex-combatant);
- (b) Harmonization of RDRC and MONUSCO data;
- (c) Provision of essential items for the stay of AG ex-combatants in demobilization centres;
- (d) Verification of identification;
- (e) Socio-economic profiling;
- (f) Identification of area of return;
- (g) Allocation of Demobilization ID cards and allocation of national ID card numbers;
- (h) Pre-Discharge Orientation Programme (PDOP) which includes socio-economic counselling and sensitisation as well as counselling and VTC on HIV/AIDS;<sup>44</sup>
- (i) Medical Screening (by the RDRC Medical Rehabilitation Unit (MRU) supported by a GoR-appointed Medical Committee);
- (j) Mental health services (in house at Mutobo);
- (k) Discharge ceremony;
- (l) Transport to community of return.

66. Some figures in RDRC quarterly reporting<sup>45</sup> differ from final totals in the annual reporting of the project.

67. During 2013, 271 ex-AG (including 1 female) and 89 ex-RDF (including 1 female) were demobilised; all were provided with essential items; 10 screened ex-AG identified as HIV positive; 95 ex-AGs completed literacy and numeracy training, and 82 completed computer literacy training.<sup>46</sup> The demobilisation of the RDF cohort in November 2013 marked the completion of demobilisation of RDF. During the same period of 2013, the MRU received 967 ex-combatants by May 2013 that required psychosocial support. Of the 967, a total of 43 were women and rest were male.<sup>47</sup>

68. During 2014, 225 ex-AG (including 1 female and 3 disabled) were demobilized. Of the 225 in total, 102 were afforded medical treatment by the MRU in Mutobo Demobilization Centre of which 5 ex-combatants were referred to Ruhengeri Hospital, 3 were admitted to Local Health Centres, and 72 were treated at referral hospitals.<sup>48</sup> Regarding psychosocial treatment, 162 ex-combatants were exposed to “psychosocial education”, 222 were individually screened, 25 were screened for PTSD and 6 ex-combatants received psychosocial treatment (psychotherapy).<sup>49</sup> A total of 260 ex-combatants were tested for HIV/AIDS and 4 tested positive (249 by Gataraga

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<sup>43</sup> RDRC, 2015: 15 – 18.

<sup>44</sup> See Annex 5 for additional detail on PDOP activities.

<sup>45</sup> RDRC, 2013 (a); (b); (c); (d).

<sup>46</sup> RDRC, 2013 (e).

<sup>47</sup> RDRC (MRU), 2013.

<sup>48</sup> RDRC, 2014: 23.

<sup>49</sup> RDRD, 2014: 24.

Health Centre and 11 by MRU). In total 61 ex-combatants participated in computer literacy training and 53 completed the training.<sup>50</sup>

69. During 2015 (Q1) 50 ex-AG (including 2 disabled ex-combatants and no females) were demobilized; 115 cases of medical treatment were given including 98 at Mutobo, 4 at Gatagara Health Centre, 12 at Ruhengeri hospital with 1 admittance to Ruhengeri; 25 screening for HIV including 14 dependents and 9 ex-combatants; 14 completed literacy and numeracy training, and 10 completed computer literacy training. Regarding psychosocial treatment and counselling 52 individuals were screened, 61 received group counselling. In total 13 individuals were identified with PTSD and 13 received psychotherapy with 1 referral to mainstream treatment.

70. In summary between Q1 2013 and Q1 2015, the Demobilization component addressed the demobilisation of 635 combatants (546 now ex-AG and 89 now ex-AF including 3 female ex-combatants and 5 disabled ex-combatants).

**Project Component: Reinsertion (US\$3,524,000 Original Project (All sources of Financing); US\$703,800 Second AF (Estimated Disbursements) Implemented by RDRC<sup>51</sup>**

71. Reinsertion is:

the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.<sup>52</sup>

72. For the RDRC, Reinsertion encompasses the provision of “special assistance” to “arriving members of armed groups and demobilized soldiers” who have “no source of income”.<sup>53</sup>

73. For the SEDRP, Reinsertion includes the services to ex-combatants during the first three-month period from the day of discharge. Activities under the reinsertion component are intended to assist demobilized ex-combatants meet their basic needs.<sup>54</sup> Support is extended to the dependents of ex-AGs. Specifically Reinsertion activities consist of:

- (a) Basic Needs Kit (BNK) which is given in the form of the cash equivalent to seeds and tools, basic household items, and transport to the community of settlement. Cost per beneficiary is FRW 60,000 (US\$86 approx<sup>55</sup>);<sup>56</sup>
- (b) Reception (including of dependents);

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<sup>50</sup> RDRC, 2014: 26.

<sup>51</sup> World Bank, 2009; 2014.

<sup>52</sup> UN, 2005.

<sup>53</sup> RDRC, 2015: 18

<sup>54</sup> World Bank, 2014: iv.

<sup>55</sup> Standardized exchange rate of 700:1.

<sup>56</sup> RDRC, 2015: 18.

- (c) Mini-PDOP for dependents of AGs including health screening and treatment at the demobilization centre, nursery for child dependents, social orientation and provision of National ID card;
- (d) Reinsertion Kit (RK) for dependents of AGs of basic consumables plus non consumables;
- (e) Medical treatment including in mainstream hospitals with bills paid for 3 months for those found to be seriously ill (*Mutuelles de Sante* should assume payment of bills after three months);
- (f) Transport to communities of return.

74. During 2013, the following were the outputs under the Reinsertion component:<sup>57</sup>

- (a) BNK: 371 including 1 ex-AG (f), 1 ex-RDF (f), 270 ex-AG (m), 89 ex-RDF (m) and
- (b) RK (dependents): 554 (total, no disaggregation)

75. During 2014 the following were the outputs under the Reinsertion component:

- (a) BNK: 80 including 25 ex-AG (f), 4 ex-RDF (f), 51 ex-AG (m)<sup>58</sup>
- (b) RK (dependents): 122 (total, no disaggregation)<sup>59</sup>

76. During 2015 (Q1) the following were the outputs under the Reinsertion component:

- (a) BNK: 50 ex-AG.
- (b) RK (dependents): 49 (total, no disaggregation)
- (c) Mini-PDOP for dependents (no data available)

**Project Component: Reintegration (US\$8,240,182 Original Project (All Sources of Financing for Social, Economic and Vulnerable); US\$3,292,000 Second AF Estimated Disbursements) Implemented by RDRC)<sup>60</sup>**

77. Reintegration is:

the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.<sup>61</sup>

78. The RDRC notes the long-term nature of the reintegration process and describes the component of the SEDRP as being “aimed at the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into the Rwandan social and economic fabric. As such it occurs over time rather than through a quick process”.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> RDRC, 2013 (e): 17-19.

<sup>58</sup> RDRC, 2014: 29.

<sup>59</sup> RDRC, 2014: 31.

<sup>60</sup> World Bank, 2009; 2014.

<sup>61</sup> UN, 2005.

<sup>62</sup> RDRC, 2015: 22

79. Specifically for the SEDRP, reintegration activities consist of “the process of facilitating the re-incorporation of disenfranchised groups into mainstream society”. Programmatically this includes the provision of assistance such as: micro-project and VSW grants, psychosocial counselling, HIV/AIDS awareness training, community sensitisation, capacity building of cooperatives, reintegration assistance for children and severely disabled.<sup>63</sup>

80. During 2013 the following were the documented outputs under the Reintegration component:<sup>64</sup>

- (a) Psychosocial training to health animators: 2,146 individuals;
- (b) ‘Psychiatric treatment’ to ex-combatants: 1,166 including 306 ex-AG (m), 18 ex-AG (f); 737 ex-RDF (m), 46 ex-RDF (f), and 59 ex-FAR (m);
- (c) Literacy training: 624 ex-combatants (no disaggregation);
- (d) RG payments: 683 ex-combatants (no disaggregation);
- (e) Vocational training (VSW recipients): 2,702 (no disaggregation);
- (f) Events: national convention for cooperatives;
- (g) Entrepreneurship training (to cooperatives): 59 cooperatives/295 participants (no disaggregation);
- (h) Capacity building (to cooperatives): 4 cooperatives for disabled ex-combatants/54 participants (no disaggregation);
- (i) Entrepreneurship training (to disabled ex-combatants): 67 ex-combatants plus spouses;
- (j) Project competition for cooperatives with awards to national and provincial level;
- (k) Job placement services (no quantitative data available);
- (l) Additional support to vulnerable groups (no quantitative data available);
- (m) Rehabilitation and Reintegration of disabled and chronically ill: subsistence allowance payments to 2,878 ex-combatants (all categories, 1- IV); housing construction 117 units in 2013;
- (n) Medial rehabilitation (specialized interventions): no breakdown for 2013, cumulative totals only.
- (o) Services to former child ex-combatants (all components but reported under Reintegration component):<sup>65</sup> 35 registrations, 42 family reunifications.

81. During 2014 the following were the documented outputs of the Reintegration component:<sup>66</sup>

- (a) Psychosocial training to health animators: (no data available);
- (b) ‘Psychiatric treatment’ to ex-combatants: 14 including 0 ex-AG (f), 1 ex-RDF (f); 71 ex-AG (m), 13 ex-RDF (m), and 0 ex-FAR;
- (c) ‘Psychosocial assistance’ to ex-combatants: 36 including 0 ex-AG (f), 4 ex-RDF (f); 7 ex-AG (m), 21 ex-RDF (m), and 4 ex-FAR (m);
- (d) Literacy training: ex-combatants (no data available);
- (e) RG payments: ex-combatants (no quantitative data available);
- (f) Vocational training (VSW recipients): (no quantitative data available);
- (g) Formal education (VSW recipients): (no quantitative data available);
- (h) IGA (fast training) (VSW recipients): 13 (VSW 11);

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<sup>63</sup> World Bank, 2014: iv.

<sup>64</sup> RDRC, 2013 (e): 19 – 34.

<sup>65</sup> RDRC, 2015 (e): 35.

<sup>66</sup> RDRC, 2014: 32f

- (i) Support to reintegration of special groups: 61 elderly ex-combatants, 32 former child ex-combatants (no quantitative data or description available);
- (j) Events: national convention for cooperatives (no quantitative data available);
- (k) Entrepreneurship training (to cooperatives): cooperatives/ participants (no data available);
- (l) Capacity building (to cooperatives): cooperatives for disabled ex-combatants/participants (no quantitative data available);
- (m) Entrepreneurship training (to disabled ex-combatants) (no quantitative data available);
- (n) Project competition for cooperatives with awards to national and provincial level;
- (o) Job placement services (no quantitative data available);<sup>67</sup>
- (p) Additional support to vulnerable groups (no quantitative data available);
- (q) Rehabilitation and Reintegration of disabled and chronically ill: subsistence allowance payments to ex-combatants (all categories, 1- IV); housing construction units in 2013 (no quantitative data available);
- (r) Medial rehabilitation (specialized interventions): no breakdown for 2013, cumulative totals only (no quantitative data available);
- (s) Services to former child ex-combatants (all components but reported under Reintegration component): registrations, family reunifications (no quantitative data available).

82. During 2015 the following were the documented main outputs of the Reintegration component:

- (a) General sensitisation (no data);
- (b) VTC: 50 ex-AG;
- (c) Psychosocial sensitisation (no data);
- (d) Psychosocial assistance: 13 ex-AG (m), 7 ex-AG (f); 79 ex-RDF (m), 7 ex-RDF (f); 7 ex-FAR (m), 2 ex-FAR (f);
- (e) Drug and Alcohol abuse treatment at Icyizere Centre (identified as ‘psychiatric treatment’):<sup>68</sup> 2 ex-AG (m); 4 ex-RDF (m), 3 ex-RDF (f);
- (f) Facilitated access to shelter (20 vulnerable ex-combatants via ICRC);
- (g) Reintegration Grant (RG): 51 ex-AG (demobilized December 2014);
- (h) Technical Assistance (TA) to Cooperatives: 5 cooperatives (4 Kigali, 1 Eastern Province);
- (i) Job Placement of 147 ex-combatants (15 Rusizi district in terracing, 20 Karongi district in team plantation and 112 Rutsiro district in terracing);
- (j) VSW screening: 12 ex-combatants from phases AG 48-50 and RDF 16B (no disaggregation);
- (k) Medical Services: 1,398 ex-combatants.<sup>69</sup>

**Project Component: Mainstreaming (US\$96,000 Second AF (Estimated Disbursements) Implemented by RDRC)<sup>70</sup>**

83. The RDRC has identified that mainstreaming is implemented through “knowledge and information sharing with mainstream Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy

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<sup>67</sup> RDRC, 2014 (a): 37 identifies employment placements given to 6,389 ex-combatants but does not record the timeframe.

<sup>68</sup> RDRC, 2015 (a): 19

<sup>69</sup> See Annex 5 for details.

<sup>70</sup> World Bank, 2014.

(EDPRS) implementing agencies, through workshops, seminars, meetings and joint activities.”<sup>71</sup> More recently this understanding is expanded to include the mainstreaming of beneficiaries into mainstream social protection and other services. Institutional mainstreaming (essentially the devolution of activities to appropriate government ministries and agencies is “further motivated by a government-wide decentralization effort to devolve the provision of services from central ministries and commissions, such as RDRC, to local authorities”).<sup>72</sup>

84. As is seen below (Section 2 and 3) conceptually and institutionally, mainstreaming is comprehensive and is constituted in how the RDRC sits within MINALOC and how many of the SEDRP activities integrate with mainstream supports broadly under the banner of social protection. Also, mainstreaming constitutes the main pillar of the World Bank’s exit strategy from the SEDRP. Since early 2015 planning for this element of further mainstreaming is governed by the legislation<sup>73</sup> which includes a new organisational structure for the RDRC.

85. For the SEDRP mainstreaming includes the orientation of beneficiaries into mainstream services (largely social protection services and medical services) as well as “the preparation, in collaboration with relevant line ministries, of a phasing out strategy to mainstream activities and subcomponents to the various ministries and agencies”.<sup>74</sup>

86. During 2013 the following were some of the documented outputs of the mainstreaming component:<sup>75</sup>

- (a) Training health animators on psychosocial problems: 2,146 trained;
- (b) Mainstreaming administration activities (meetings, workshops and assessment meetings with MINALOC and other GoR partners).

87. During 2014, the following were some of the documented outputs of the mainstreaming component:<sup>76</sup>

- (a) Training of staff on gender responsiveness;
- (b) Consultative meetings with relevant stakeholders in the process and beneficiaries;
- (c) Workshop on HIV/AIDs, drug use and psychosocial support.

88. During 2015, the following were some of the documented outputs of the mainstreaming component:<sup>77</sup>

- (a) National Conference on Reintegration and Mainstreaming (host);
- (b) Planning (including for mainstreaming support to cooperatives with NCCR and RICEM).

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<sup>71</sup> RDRC, 2013 (e): 35.

<sup>72</sup> RDRC 2015: 49.

<sup>73</sup> Draft Law establishing the Rwanda Demonilization and Reintegratio Commission (RDRC) and Determining its Responsibilities, Organisation and Functioning (unsigned). Also, Uwizeye, Judith Minister of Public Service and Labour. *Re: Implementation of the Restructuring of the Public Services Institutions* (correspondence) 1<sup>st</sup> August 2014.

<sup>74</sup> World Bank, 2014: iv-v.

<sup>75</sup> RDRC, 2013 (e): 35 – 37.

<sup>76</sup> RDRC, 2014 (a): 38f.

<sup>77</sup> RDRC, 2015 (a): 19, 46 – 50.

89. While it can be seen above that documented outputs in the mainstreaming component seen by the evaluation are minimal, much progress in mainstreaming has been made through the day-to-day work and coordination of the project meaning that as they are documented, the meagre outputs do not reflect the solid progress of implementation. The Bank's Aide Memories have more data on outputs but this divergence between RDRC and Bank reporting should be rectified by the RDRC as it is making highly satisfactory progress on this component.

### **1.5 Alterations to Original Project Components and Outputs and Justification (World Bank)**

90. The Project underwent alterations with the end of the Original Grant period and the addition of a second period of AF.

91. Specifically:

- (a) Reinsertion component, the addition of (i) provision of social orientation for dependants;
- (b) Reintegration component, the addition of: (i) Mental health screening, counselling, treatment, or referral for adult and children ex-combatants; (ii) support to disabled ex-combatants through Integrated Rehabilitation Workshops (equipment and training).

92. The Reinsertion component was revised based on “surveys and qualitative research”<sup>78</sup> which show the importance of the family in the reintegration of ex-combatants and the need to assist returning dependents of AGs to adjust to life in Rwanda. Certainly this is supported by recent work outside the project on the role of the family in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda in the return and reintegration of ex-combatants.<sup>79 80</sup>

93. The justification to changes to the Reintegration component adding mental health supports originate in experience from the project during the lifetime of the original grant plus other ‘in-depth research on mental health conducted in the region’ which identified the impact of poor mental health on everyday functioning. Certainly research from within the Bank<sup>81</sup> and through external professionals<sup>82</sup> supports this analysis.

94. The justification to changes to the Reintegration component adding support to disabled ex-combatants is that this cohort of ex-combatants “need additional support to achieve economic reintegration”<sup>83</sup> and providing equipment and cooperative training to the GoR funded Integrated Rehabilitation Workshops is using “an innovative additional entry point”<sup>84</sup> to support economic reintegration of disabled ex-combatants. During the field visit for the evaluation the workshop did not have equipment but medical services were available on site.

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<sup>78</sup> World Bank, 2014: 3.

<sup>79</sup> Finn, 2014.

<sup>80</sup> Specht, 2014.

<sup>81</sup> Hinkel, 2013.

<sup>82</sup> LOGiCA/Promondo, 2014

<sup>83</sup> World Bank, 2014: 4.

<sup>84</sup> World Bank, 2014: 4.

95. Project indicators were revised as outlined above (Section 1.2) in order to “take into account lessons learnt and additional activities”.<sup>85</sup> This is justifiable given the changes to the components and the documented lessons learnt.

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<sup>85</sup> World Bank, 2014: 4.

## 2. Performance: PDO, Outcomes and Implementation

96. The following section is an examination of project *outcomes* at the time of the external independent evaluation. Outcomes differ from outputs in so far as they are the short to medium term changes that follow on from project activities and the production of outputs. This section of the evaluation includes an examination of the factors found to have influenced the implementation of the project (positive and negative). It addresses aspects of the project design and implementation that fall outside the project components or which straddle more than one of the components.

97. The assessment of outcomes and implementation does not solely rely on documented data but triangulates data from a variety of sources including consultations and assessments.

### 2.1 Progress towards achievement of PDO and other Outcomes

98. This section of the evaluation presents the ratings for the progress towards achievement of PDO; progress towards achievement of outcomes (as per 2009 and 2014 project documentation); examination of outcomes per component. This section also draws on findings from the 2015 Tracer, PVS and Community Dynamics surveys where appropriate.

99. In 2009 and 2014 the Project is identified as having three outcomes:<sup>86 87</sup>

- (a) Increased number of beneficiaries settled in their chosen communities;
- (b) Improved capacity of beneficiaries to advance their own social and economic reintegration, and
- (c) Increased access of ex-combatants to social services through central and local government service provision mechanisms (as opposed to through program activities).

100. The project outcomes as per the project documentation are not quantified: they identify the essence of achievement of outcomes as being located in ‘increasing’ settlement, capacity and access but there is not definitive benchmark as to what constitutes an acceptable increase. Project targets in the results framework present additional measures based largely on the data from successive Tracer, PVS and Community Dynamics studies.

101. The mission of the project is: “to support successful demobilisation, social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants in their respective community so as to realize national security, reconciliation and development. This will be achieved through demobilising ex-combatants and supporting their social and economic reintegration into communities of their own choice for a fresh start.”<sup>88</sup>

102. The evaluation finds that the project is **likely** to achieve its PDO by the proposed close of the project in December 2017. At the time of evaluation the project has supported the GoR to demobilise members of AGs of Rwandan origin and members for the RDF to the extent that the RDF cohort has been completed. The project has supported the GoR to provide a wide variety of

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<sup>86</sup> World Bank, 2014: 1.

<sup>87</sup> World Bank, 2009:

<sup>88</sup> RDRC, 2015: 7.

socio-economic reintegration supports to demobilised ex-combatants and their dependants and has supported the GoR to focus on female, children and disabled ex-combatants although the numbers of female ex-combatants are very low and the numbers of former child combatants are limited. These two factors are outside the control of the project.

103. Specifically the following is the performance of the project against its main targets for its PDO:

**104. Number of demobilized RDF members (disaggregated by gender, ill/disabled). This remained unchanged for the second AF. No target set for second AF. Confirmed to be 100 percent (see section 1.2 above).**

105. In total and according to data provided by the RDRC<sup>89</sup>, between January 2009 and the end of Q1 2015 the project has demobilized 4,000 RDF ex-combatants including 4 female ex-combatants and 110 disabled ex-combatants.

106. Given that this is the number of RDF documented by the RDRC and no data has been identified to contradict that this was all the eligible RDF the evaluation finds that the project has successfully reached its target for this target.

**107. Number of demobilized AG members (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled). This remained unchanged for the second AF. No target set for second AF. Confirmed to be 100 percent (see section 1.2 above).**

108. In total and according to data provided by the RDRC,<sup>90</sup> between January 2009 and the end of Q1 2015 the project has demobilized 4,280 AGs including 25 females and 128 disabled ex-combatants.

109. Given that this is the number of AG documented by the RDRC and no data has been identified to contradict this or to quantify those refused due to being identified as ‘recyclers’ or civilians, the evaluation finds that the project has successfully reached its target for this target.

**110. Percentage of demand for demobilization services met. This remained unchanged for the second AF. Target remained unchanged for second AF: 100 percent (2013, 2014 and 2015).**

111. In total and according to the data provided by the RDRC 100 percent of demand has been met. In the evaluation those refused demobilisation services were identified by the RDRC as ‘recyclers’ or civilians seeking benefits. No quantitative data was provided regarding those refused demobilisation. On this basis and data the evaluation finds that the project has reached its target for this target.

**112. Percentage of ex-combatants who are economically active (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled). This target was subject to a revised target and gender disaggregation. The target at the time of evaluation is 70 percent (2014 and 2015). Progress was 62 percent in 2013.**

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<sup>89</sup> RDRD, 2015: 11.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

113. The evaluation finds that the project has successfully reached the 2015 target for this target. The Project Results Framework uses a particular criteria of those considered economically active (Table 1) thus giving the result that 75.5 percent of ex-combatants compared to 77.4 percent of civilians are economically active.

**Table 1. Percentage of ex-combatants economically active (Rev'd Project Results Framework)**

Is the respondent economically active? (when the primary vocation in Q14.1.1 is economically active)	Ex-combatant	Civilian	Male ex-combatant	Male civilian	Disabled ex-combatant	Disabled civilian	Able-bodied ex-combatant	Able-bodied civilian	Youth ex-combatant (24 years or less)	Youth civilian (24 years or less)	Not youth ex-combatant (25 year olds +)	Not youth civilian (25 year olds +)	ex-AF	ex-AG	Former child combatant	Former adult ex-combatant	
Economically active (empl, self-empl, hustle in informal economy, supplementing income via subsistence)	75.5	77.4	75.3	82.0	50.5	59.3	81.1	78.7	70.5	62.8	76.1	79.2	73.1	77.6	69.4	77.0	
Economically inactive (unempl, studying, retired, housewife)	24.5	22.6	24.7	18.0	49.5	40.7	18.9	21.3	29.5	37.2	23.9	20.8	26.9	22.4	30.6	23.0	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	511	398	506	261	93	27	418	371	61	43	448	355	234	277	98	413	
Diff within cluster			-1.9		-6.7		-8.8		2.4		7.7		-3.1		-4.5		-7.6

Source: 2015 CDS dataset

114. **Percentage of ex-combatants who report social acceptance by their communities (disaggregated by gender, child, ill/disabled). This target was subject to a revision in order to exclude reporting by children. Reporting by former child-ex-combatants is not affected. The target at the time of evaluation is 80 percent (for years 2014 and 2015). Progress was 78 percent in 2013.**

115. The evaluation finds that the project has failed to meet the 2015 target for this target with 64.3 percent of ex-combatants (69.9 percent ex-AF and 59.5 percent ex-AG) reporting that they feel accepted in their immediate community. Of disabled ex-combatants, 60.8 percent report they feel accepted and of former child combatants 60.8 percent report they are accepted. No gender analysis was possible in the CDS due to low frequency of female respondents (n5 to this question).

116. While this result does not reach the target set in the Revised Results Framework it exceeds the level of acceptance reported by civilians (44.1 percent).

**Table 2. Acceptance**

Q 5.8cat To what extent do you feel that you are accepted or rejected as part of the community where you live?	CD-XC	CD-Civilian	Disabled former excombatant	Able-bodied former excombatant	Disabled civilian	Able-bodied civilian	Excombatant 24 years or less years olds	Excombatant 25 year olds and over	Civilian 24 years or less years olds	Civilian 25 year olds and over	ex-RPA / ex-RDF / ex-FAR	ex-AG	Former child combatant
CDS 2015													
Rejected	6.5	1.8	8.7	6	4	1.7	3.3	7	4.8	1.5	6.9	6.2	4.1
Neither accepted nor rejected	29.3	54	30.4	29	56	53.9	39.3	27.8	59.5	53.4	23.2	34.4	35.1
Accepted	64.3	44.1	60.8	65	40	44.4	57.4	65.2	35.7	45.2	69.9	59.5	60.8
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
n=	509	383	92	417	25	358	61	446	42	341	233	276	97

Source: 2015 CDS dataset.

117. *Number of direct project beneficiaries disaggregated by gender. This is identified as 'continued' for the second AF. However, the indicator is not included in the results framework for the original grant. No target is set for the second AF.*

According to data provided by the RDRC, the breakdown of direct project beneficiaries of the project between January 2009 and end of Q1 2015 is as follows: 8,251 male ex-combatants and 29 female ex-combatants. By June 2014 (most recent ISR made available to the evaluation) the project had benefited 7321 dependents who had received reinsertion kits.

118. This represents the number of ex-combatants who have been processed through the SEDRP since 2009. However, due to the huge diversity of services delivered by the project it could be possible to expand the definition of project beneficiaries to incorporate a host of other individuals ranging from the extended families of ex-AG who benefit from the outcomes of the mini-PDOP to the numbers of health animators who benefit from psychosocial training which as seen above in 2013 alone was 2,146 individuals. There is also the question of beneficiaries who receive multiple supports (not just in terms of reinsertion or reintegration assistance during their formal DDR but also those who are later identified as having health or social protection needs and are referred to mainstream services or in some cases supported directly by the units within the RDRC such as the MRU). However, if these nuances in what constitutes a direct project beneficiary were agreed it remains the case that the quantitative data to assess the true size of direct project beneficiaries is simply not available or accessible.

119. In general, the support provided to beneficiaries has evolved with the Project over time largely in response to learning from the project implementation (both from the perspective of the GoR/RDRC and the Bank) and external analysis from experts including those directly contracted by the GoR/RDRC and in complementary Bank studies and third party studies.

120. The evaluation credits the project implementers (RDRC) with applying a flexible approach to integrating learning into programming improvements and into improving the capacity of particular units responsible for the implementation of sub-components; for example, the work of the MRU on psychosocial and medical rehabilitation and the willingness of the RDRC to invest in improving the PTSD diagnostic capabilities of the unit during Q2 2015. That said, even in the case of the MRU there is much room for further refinement of the services delivered to ex-combatants and their dependents (Section 2.4 below) and often the particular response needed to react to learning appears to take some time to be designed or implemented.

121. In general, the project implementer has responded positively to lessons learned including those identified in the World Bank reporting.<sup>91</sup> However, at the time of evaluation the RDRC appeared in a state of flux with many staff having recently shifted roles and some staff churn is evident. Partially this is explained by the RDRC preparing to align with a new organisational structure for the post-SEDRP period but the net effect is that the implementer assumes a risk of becoming less effective in its achievement of the objective to improve the capacity of all beneficiaries to advance their own social and economic integration, particularly as it concerns some sub-populations that have been classified as vulnerable such as former child ex-combatants.

122. Specifically, regarding former child ex-combatants the implementer has struggled to reliably implement scheduled follow-ups as agreed in action points with the donor. This is clearly acknowledged by the RDRC as an issue to be addressed. The 2015 PIM maps out the supports and DDR programming for former-child ex-combatants<sup>92</sup> and the implementer has designed and implemented a pilot mentorship programme designed to support both the economic and social reintegration for the beneficiaries, the internal assessment of which will be conducted during Q2 and Q3 2015. However, internal shifts in staff and staff holding multiple roles increases the risk that the RDRC will fail to address already complicated challenges such as how and when to follow up with former-child ex-combatants and indeed within what time period can be neglected.

123. That said, former child combatants perform very well in practically all indicators of social reintegration and in comparison to ex-combatant youth and civilian youth. The major challenges for former child combatants are economic in nature, principally access to land and ownership of residential property where they lag behind civilian youth.<sup>93</sup>

124. Historically, the Project was conceived to provide continuity for the DDR programming of the RDRP stage 2 (closed December 2008). The RDRP stage 2 was a product of a regional, multi-agency collaboration to contribute to peace and stability not only in Rwanda but also in the Great Lakes Region (GLR). Since the close of the RDRP stage 2 and the implementation of the SEDRP under RDRP stage 3, Rwanda has evolved into a stable state in the region.

125. Considered generically, DDR programming is part of the overall stabilization effort. In other words DDR provides some of the “building blocks” in the transition from conflict to peace and often runs on a continuum between conflict to stabilization, transition, recovery, peace and development.<sup>94</sup>

126. Regarding the stabilization of Rwanda, it is clear the project has consolidated the results of the RDRP and the SEDRP (since 2009). It has facilitated the successful completion of DDR for the RDF to the point where currently security sector reform (SSR) of the RDF is managed through a separate process to the national DDR programme. From the perspective of some donors and key informants, the demobilization of the RDF should have always been a separate SSR process, not one managed through DDR including through the SEDRP (not just RDRP). However, the planned-for outcome of completing the DDR of the remaining cohort of RDF ex-combatants has been achieved within the envisaged project timeframe.

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<sup>91</sup> World Bank 2013 and 2014 AMs as per references.

<sup>92</sup> RDRC, 2015: 45 – 49.

<sup>93</sup> See 2015 CDS and Annex 2 in this report.

<sup>94</sup> UN, 2013 (2.20).

127. Based on results from the 2015 Tracer and in comparison to 2012, the overall situation of ex-combatants has improved economically and socially as well as in key demographic aspects such as health. The data in the 2015 Tracer presents a positive picture indicating improvements in economic and social aspects of the daily lives of ex-combatants when compared with data from 2012. However, there are areas of concern particularly those ex-combatants trapped in deprivation and the educational situation of youth ex-combatants.

128. Specifically, there is a cohort of approximately 15.0 percent of all ex-combatants in acute deprivation, i.e. being unable to resolve basic needs including one's next meal. For this cohort of ex-combatants, their situation in acute deprivation is the persistent barrier to successful economic activity in any form. Acute deprivation is also identified as the main barrier by 42.9 percent of disabled ex-combatants. As is discussed in the 2015 Tracer this represents 77.3 percent of ex-combatants who identify their economic activity as unsuccessful. This compares with 2012 where acute deprivation is the main barrier for ex-AF at 55.6 percent and 13.5 percent of ex-AGs. Year on year this represents a significant increase in those apparently trapped in acute deprivation and thus unable to work their way out into successful income generating projects.

129. Addressing acute deprivation is a particularly pertinent challenge for the RDRC as it mainstreams its services into the social protection ministry, MINALOC.

130. In general, the project has contributed to the stabilization of Rwanda and to the stabilization efforts in the region, particularly in DRC, through the demobilization and reintegration of ex-AGs and their dependants. That said, the external environment in the DRC is complex and well outside the control of the project and despite the on-going implementation of RDRC's own and joint (with MONUSCO) communications strategy, the RDRC can only do so much to influence the situation in DRC. Regardless, the fact that Rwanda remains stable and that the sizeable population of ex-combatants and their dependants (just one but a significant and heterogeneous group of potential 'spoilers' of peace and development) has been successfully reintegrated into Rwandan society is clearly a major contribution to post-conflict stabilization in the region and in the country.

131. While generally the impact of the project on national and regional stabilization can be assumed to have been significant there is a point in time where DDR winds-down, usually at some time during the cross-over from transition and recovery to peace and development.<sup>95</sup> Arguably, given the slow-down in return of combatants from AGs the SEDRP is approaching that point.

132. The anticipated large quantity of ex-AG that is repeated throughout the project documentation (Bank and RDRC) has not materialized but constitutes the main rationale for granting a no-cost extension to December 2017. The factors mitigating against a mass return are largely outside the scope of influence of the project but the project has made strong attempts at using what it has at its disposal to sensitise and stimulate a mass return of AGs. These means ranging from a comprehensive, coherent and partnership-orientated communications strategy to trading on an evidence based reputation regarding the supports afforded ex-AG and their dependants through the SEDRP and other programming. That said, the trickle of ex-combatants is not so limited as to mirror that in the Ugandan process towards the end of the UgDRP.<sup>96</sup> In 2014

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<sup>95</sup> UN, 2013 (2.20).

<sup>96</sup> World Bank, 2011.

and 2015 there have been 79 demobilisations (Q1 2014); 50 demobilisations (Q2 2014); 48 demobilisations (Q3 2014); 51 (Q4 2014) and 50 (Q1 2015) for a total of 278 ex-AG. Additional to demobilisations, there has been on-going reintegration support to a larger number of ex-combatants (albeit reducing in line with the reducing demobilisations).

133. Nearly 300 ex-combatants in 15 months is not an insignificant number of ex-combatants: even a small force of 300 rebels can pose a significant security threat and can catalyse discontent, particularly within disenfranchised communities. Consequently, while the project is drawing to a close and mainstreaming within the wider social protection architecture in Rwanda is progressing, there is justification to retain some institutional architecture and organisational capacity in the RDRC (as separate from the SEDRP). Consequently, the commitment of the GoR to the future remit of the RDRC is wise.

## **2.2 Component: Demobilisation**

134. Following the act of disarmament, demobilisation is the next step in a DDR programme. Demobilisation programming ranges from a light touch with little orientation to the more complex demobilisation offered through the project. Demobilisation in the SEDRP has evolved to target both ex-combatants and their dependants and in doing so kickstarts DDR programming and what is hoped to be the longer term reintegration of the demobilized back into Rwandan society.

135. The only target for the component is **the percentage of demobilised persons who are satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilization centres. The target remained unchanged for the second AF. The target at the time of evaluation is 80 percent (2014 and 2015). Progress was 96 percent in 2013.**

136. The evaluation finds that the project has met the 2014/2015 target for this target. This finding is based on multiple variables in the 2015 PVS and not on a single variable asking whether or not ex-combatants were satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilization centres.

137. This is quite a wide selection of indicators<sup>97</sup> and the RDRC has its own satisfaction survey to counter any findings in the PVS in this regard. However, splitting the indicators out into satisfaction with Demobilization services/information and with PDOP services and information, the following are the findings of the PVS and evaluation.

138. Satisfaction with PDOP trainings was high, with 93.2 percent of those who responded feeling satisfied or very satisfied with the language used to conduct the trainings, 90.4 percent feeling satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of trainers or training staff, 87.6 percent with the relevance of the course material, 87.4 percent with the number of participants, 87.1 percent with the training time arrangements, 85.6 percent satisfied or very satisfied with the training content, and 82.0 percent with the length of the trainings. Respondents were least satisfied with the level of post-training support and follow-up with a quarter feeling either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, and 15.9 percent feeling neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the level of support/follow-up.

139. Former child combatants (n22) were surveyed separately. Regarding satisfaction, the following can be observed. Satisfaction with accommodation (n12 and n4 satisfied and very

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<sup>97</sup> Source: 2014 PVS.

satisfied); satisfaction with food (n14 and n3 satisfied and very satisfied); satisfaction with how staff interacted (n13, n3 satisfied and very satisfied); satisfaction with civic education (n12 and n5 satisfied and very satisfied); satisfaction with agricultural training (n13 and n3 satisfied and very satisfied); satisfaction with counselling (n13 and n4 satisfied and very satisfied); satisfaction with psychosocial services (n14 and n4 satisfied and very satisfied); satisfaction with training (n14 and n3 satisfied and very satisfied); satisfaction with medical screening (n13 and n2 satisfied and very satisfied).

### **2.3 Component: Reinsertion**

140. At the time of the independent evaluation, the performance of the Project in relation to the achievement of the targets is as follows:

141. **Number of ex-combatants who have received reinsertion benefits (BNK, RSA) in time and in accordance with the implementation manual.** *The target remained unchanged for the second AF. The target at the time of evaluation is 95 percent (2014 and 2015). Progress was 95 percent in 2013.*

142. The evaluation finds given that the project has met the 2014 and 2015 target for this target.

143. In total 97.8 percent of self-identified eligible ex-combatants indicated they had received the BNK and 94 percent of those who received it indicated they had done so prior to leaving the demobilization centre. In total 91.3 percent of self-identified eligible ex-combatants indicated they had received RSA of which 87.7 percent indicated they had done so within three months of reinsertion into the community of return.<sup>98</sup>

144. Regarding ‘eligibility’, the evaluation notes below that eligibility for VSW is defined as all beneficiaries who have been demobilized in a certain time frame and are allowed to be screened to determine what their level of vulnerability is. Based on this screening, the most vulnerable are selected to receive VSW. This indicator measures to what extent those who have been selected and registered in a particular.<sup>99</sup> However, for the purposes of collecting quantitative data, the evaluation (and the PVS) relies on self-identified eligibility as is standard practice in quantitative surveying. As such that may be one of the reasons for variances between the independent data and that held by the RDRC.

145. **Number of reinsertion kits delivered to dependents of ex-AG members.** *target remained unchanged for the second AF. No target set.*

146. The evaluation finds that based on PVS data, the project has delivered reinsertion kits to 95.9 percent of eligible the dependents of ex-combatants.<sup>100</sup>

147. **Percentage of ex-combatants who settle down in their community of choice (with access to shelter and food security).** *target remained unchanged for the second AF. The target at the time of evaluation is 95 percent (2014 and 2015). Progress was 100 percent in 2013.*

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<sup>98</sup> Source: PVS 2015.

<sup>99</sup> Lemasle (Correspondence), 14<sup>th</sup> June 2015.

<sup>100</sup> Finn and Baxter, 2015.

148. The evaluation finds that the project has met its 2014/2015 target for the target.

149. In the PVS 95.9 percent indicated that they had freely chosen their community of reinsertion.<sup>101</sup>

150. After leaving the demobilization center, respondents resettled across all 30 districts, with Huye, Kicukiro, and Rubavu being the most resettled among the sample. The PVS study found that while 95.4 percent of the survey respondents reported that they had freely chosen their reintegration location, the majority cited family reasons for doing so. Younger respondents reported freedom of choice to a lesser extent (89.8 percent) than their older counterparts (95.9 percent of 30-39 years, 97.4 percent of 40-54 years, and 100 percent of 55 and older).

## **2.4 Component: Reintegration**

151. At the time of the independent evaluation, the performance of the project in the achievement of planned outcomes of the Reintegration component is as follows.

### **152. Number of ex-combatants who receive reintegration benefits (RG) in time and in accordance with the implementation manual.**

153. The PVS finds that while the disbursement levels under the RG were anticipated to be similar to the BNK, 84.2 percent of respondents confirmed that they received RGs (70.5 percent of ex-AFs, 90.3 percent of ex-AGs, and 42.4 percent of the former child combatants). Of this 84.2 percent, 87.1 percent received their RG within three months after demobilization. The majority of the remainder of payments was received between three to eight weeks after the three month target.

154. Those who received the RG reported satisfaction with most aspects of the grant. Responses were divided evenly as to whether the reintegration option chosen was appropriate for their individual circumstance or the structure of the local economy but approximately 60 percent stated that they would not have made the same choice in retrospect. This large proportion reflects negatively on the counselling for choice of sub-project that is provided by the RDRC. Receipt of RG required recipients to submit a proposal for a viable sub-project and the PVS finds there has been a 71.1 percent success rate. Crop (for 30.8 percent) and livestock farming (27.4 percent) topped the list of sub-projects by a wide margin.

155. The PVS identified that RG recipients most frequently applied their payment towards agricultural (33.7 percent), 'general' (28.6 percent), and non-farm related (26.2 percent) income-generating activities. The survey results suggest that RG payments, by and large, were applied to appropriate sub-project activities, with the notable exceptions of the 8.5 percent who claimed to have "squandered it."

156. Neither the evaluation nor the PVS was able to identify why 28.9 percent of RG recipients reported having received the grant without developing a sub-project.

157. **Percentage of ex-combatants that have completed the income generating activity as planned.** This target was only for the original project and as such is not recorded in any variable for the 2014 quantitative studies. However, the main IGA activity linked to benefits appears to be

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<sup>101</sup> Finn and Baxter, 2015.

the training on income generation given to VSW recipients. Of those who received VSW, the PVS found that 84.7 percent received training on income generation.

158. **Percentage of ex-combatants who have successfully completed the agreed training/education plan. This target was only for the original project. For the AF the target was revised as follows: Percentage of ex-combatants selected to receive VSW support and registered to receive training who have successfully completed training/education (Target 90 percent).**

159. The evaluation finds that the project has failed to reach the 2014 target. The evaluation finds that 82.1 percent of eligible ex-combatants received VSW support. In total 72.9 percent of those who received VSW also received training in project planning and entrepreneurship as part of the apprenticeship, vocational or income generation training.

160. It is pertinent to observe that the PVS probed level of appropriateness of the VSW to the recipient’s personal circumstances via various vulnerability factors at time of award. While less recipients responded to this set of questions (about n76 on average) than those who received the support, the following were the reasons cited for their selection as VSW recipients (Table 3).

**Table 3. Reasons for selection as VSW recipient.**

%	Overall (r/T)	Category		Age of respondent at last birthday				Vulnerable Groups			
		Ex-Armed Forces	Ex-Armed Group	16-29 years	30-39 years	40-54 years	55 years or more	Female	Former Child Combatant	Disabled	Returned with Dependents
Did not own a personal house	r=41/71	60.0	55.6	28.6	56.7	66.7	No Response	No Response	0.0	41.7	73.9
No access to arable land	r=48/76	67.6	59.0	28.6	75.0	60.0	100.0	NR	0.0	71.4	83.3
Lack of income	r=44/76	62.2	53.8	14.3	59.4	68.6	0.0	NR	0.0	57.1	66.7
Lack of assets	r=49/76	67.6	61.5	28.6	68.8	68.6	100.0	NR	0.0	64.3	75.0
Lack of vocational skills	r=50/76	64.9	66.7	42.9	65.6	71.4	100.0	NR	0.0	71.4	70.8
Lack of skills for establishing an income generating activity	r=46/77	62.2	57.5	57.1	56.3	63.9	100.0	NR	50.0	71.4	52.0
Permanent disability	r=16/76	16.2	25.6	14.3	18.8	25.7	0.0	NR	0.0	64.3	32.0
Already had a chronic disease	r=17/76	18.9	25.6	14.3	21.9	22.9	100.0	NR	0.0	42.9	36.0

Source: 2015 PVS dataset.

161. **Percentage of affected ex-combatants who have received psychosocial assistance.** This target was only for the original project. For the AF, the target was revised as follows: **Percentage of incoming ex-combatants who are screened for mental health issues (disaggregated by adult/children) with a target of 70 percent for 2014 and 75 percent for 2015.**

162. The independent evaluation finds that the project has reached the 2014 and 2015 target for this target.

163. In total 77.6 percent of ex-combatants were screened for mental health issues. Of the cohort of former child ex-combatants, 77.0 percent were screened for mental health issues. While not included as part of the target it is useful to see that when analysed further the data presents

that during the recently introduced mini-PDOP, 31.6 percent of ex-combatants indicate that their dependants were screened for mental health issues (40.5 percent for medical issues) and 34.2 percent that specifically their children were screened.

## **2.5 Component: Mainstreaming**

164. At the time of the independent evaluation the outcomes of the Mainstreaming component are as follows.

**165. Percentage of categorized disabled ex-combatants who receive Mutuelles de Sante and Monthly Allowance as per current legislation and within 9 months after demobilization. Target for 2014 and 2015 is 95 percent. Progress in 2013 was 96 percent.**

166. The evaluation finds that regarding access to *Mutuelles de Santé* for disabled ex-combatants it appears that the project has failed to reach the 2015 target for the target. As per the 2015 PVS, the evaluation finds that of the cohort of disabled ex-combatants 75.9 percent have *Mutuelles de Sante*. All disabled ex-combatants in the PVS were Category 1 to 4 and the following is the breakout of category and possession of *Mutuelles de Santé*: *Category 1 (100.0 percent); Category 2 (70.6 percent); Category 3 (70.0 percent) and Category 4 (81.5 percent)*.<sup>102</sup> Of the same overall cohort, 72.7 percent received their Monthly Allowance within the 9-month timeframe. It is noted that the World Bank prefers data from the RDRC MRU to that compiled in the PVS asserting that the sample in the PVS is “not necessarily a completely representative sample”. Because at the time of the evaluation the data from the MRU was not consulted, the evaluation cannot verify the data presented by the Bank from the MRU indicating that 96 percent of disabled ex-combatants have received *Mutuelles de Santé*.

167. The evaluation notes that this low percentage differs from the proportions identified in the 2015 CDS and 2015 Tracer where of the disabled cohort 84.8 percent and 84.1 percent respectively identify that they have *Mutuelles de Sante*. However, both the CDS and Tracer are over 10 percent lower than the target. **Percentage of ex-combatants provided with a national ID registration before they leave the demobilization centre. Target is 80 percent (2014) and 90 percent (2015).**

168. The results framework stipulates that the PVS is *to be the source of* data for this target. However, the evaluation does not deliver a finding for **the target regarding the receipt of a national identity card number mainly due to an avoidable limitation in the PVS survey, the data for receipt of national identity cards** or numbers cannot be disaggregated by year of demobilization.

169. If general PVS data was employed, the evaluation would conclude that the project has failed to meet the 2014 and 2015 (95.0 percent) target for this proportion of ex-combatants in receipt of a national identity card prior to leaving the demobilization centre. As per the 2014 PVS, the evaluation concludes that 62.0 percent of all ex-combatants has received a National ID number. In total 58.7 percent of the ex-RPA/ex-RDF compared to 65.1 percent of the ex-AG obtained a national ID number. However, if responses to the question regarding receipt of national identity cards are ignored and rather the proportion of ex-combatants who identified themselves on the survey via their national identity number is considered then 74.6 percent of demobilized ex-combatants who responded to the PVS have a national identity number. Data

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<sup>102</sup> Source: 2014 PVS dataset.

from the 2015 Tracer which can be disaggregated by year shows that n9 of n13 2014 demobilizations provided a national identification number (69.2 percent of ex-combatants).

170. The reported (by ex-combatants) delay in obtaining national ID cards is a particular issue of concern for ex-AGs some of whom raised the issue that they believed they were being discriminated against when seeking employment due to being identified as an ex-AG during the 2015 CDS qualitative phase. This identification was unavoidable as the only form of ID they had was a Demobilization card (not a national ID) and the Demobilization card identifies them as ex-AG (rather than a civilian without highlighting former allegiance to an armed group or force).

## **2.5 Summary: Factors affecting achievement of outcomes**

171. In the following section there is a detailed discussion of the factors affecting the achievement of outcomes. This section draws primarily on analysis of documentation, completed consultations with key informants and where needed cross-referencing with data from quantitative surveys for the 2015 Tracer, PVS and CDS.

172. In the following section there is occasional reference to the institutional arrangements of the RDRC (in relation to other social protection agencies and line ministries) and some reference to apparent capacity limitations at the RDRC as they may affect the work with vulnerable sub-groups particularly former child ex-combatants and those with mental health challenges. The evaluation notes that these observations are made in the context of the performance of the project and the evaluation does not include an audit of the organisational capacity or structure of the RDRC.

173. In summary, the factors affecting the implementation and outcomes of the Project can be broadly grouped as follows. The main factors **positively** affecting the Project outcomes are:

- (a) Generally positive country context, particularly economic growth and poverty alleviation;
- (b) Alignment of the project with the social inclusion priorities of the GoR and institutionally under MINALOC particularly concerning mainstreaming (by design) of project activities;
- (c) Buy-in from the GoR (financial and regarding sustainability);
- (d) Policy alignment with key social policies particularly gender and disability;
- (e) Comprehensive communications strategy including with MONUSCO;
- (f) Flexibility to allow reaction to opportunities to improve services to returning ex-AGs and their dependents particularly through the mini-PDOP and attempts to expand the coverage of mental health screening through the work of the MRU.

174. The main factors **negatively** affecting the Project outcomes are:

- (a) Broad set of factors mitigating against the planned-for and prioritised return of ex-AGs from DRC;
- (b) Lack of opportunity to realise key policies through implementation, particularly gender mainstreaming;
- (c) Limitations either through human capacity or other factors on services provided to some vulnerable groups particularly former child ex-combatants including as a result of staff churn, staff capacity and the reassignment of staff roles in the RDRC;

- (d) Challenges regarding M&E, information centralisation and collation particularly concerning the demographic data of ex-combatants and the performance of the MRU;
- (e) Challenges regarding accountability, monitoring and implementation in a context of scaling down DDR programming and scaling up social protection programming: in other words the problem of the question where does DDR end and social inclusion begin?

175. Regarding those factors positively influencing the achievement of the project outcomes the following are the findings of the evaluation.

176. **Positive country context, particularly in economic growth.** Of all the factors that challenge the reintegration component of DDR programmes, a lack of economic opportunities and/or a lack of realistic market assessment are one of the most critical barriers to successful outcomes. Apart from issues with achieving a market assessment and aligning reintegration programming with realistic income generating opportunities such as is the case now with South Sudan or was the case during the UgDRP in Uganda, the absorptive capacity of local or national markets is critical to facilitating the return of former combatants to economic productivity.

177. As has been discussed above the project has performed reasonably well. According to the CDS quantitative data, ex-combatants in general have a similar economic profile of economic activity as a representative sample of civilians with disabled ex-combatants out-performing civilians with disabilities in all economic indicators.<sup>103</sup> It is clear that both social and economic skills with which some ex-combatants have been equipped with through the project reintegration activities including vocational training have enhanced their capacity to reintegrate economically.<sup>104</sup> However, the critical absorptive capacity of the market is the major external factor assisting economic reintegration and enabling ex-combatants to be mobile in the jobs market. That said, the duration of skilling in vocation centres, support to form economic cooperatives but more so the reported success of such initiatives such as job placement with government agencies has assisted the project perform well regarding the economic reintegration of ex-combatants.

178. Rwanda's economic outlook is appraised by donors including those involved in the project as overwhelmingly positive particularly when compared to that in some neighbouring countries. In the five years preceding this evaluation there have been significant reductions in the national poverty line and the poverty gap ratio and there has been "an effective translation into poverty reduction".<sup>105</sup> Distribution of growth has concentrated in rural areas where many ex-combatants have chosen to resettle and the current EDPRS 2 has a progressive agenda to include private-sector led growth and reduce poverty including extreme poverty and concurrently reduce aid dependency.

179. Given this overwhelmingly positive economic assessment and outlook, the absorptive capacity of the Rwandan economy and labour market is likely to continue to drive the economic reintegration of ex-combatants as long as social protection better targets vulnerable ex-

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<sup>103</sup> See 2015 CDS.

<sup>104</sup> Finn et al, 2013.

<sup>105</sup> World Bank, 2013: 7.

combatants, socio-political factors do not impede reintegration and stability, and future return of AGs is effectively managed.

180. **Alignment of the project with the social inclusion priorities of the GoR and institutionally under MINALOC.** Institutionally because the RDRC sits within MINALOC, the alignment of the project under the social inclusion priorities of the GoR is a cross-cutting theme supporting project effectiveness in a variety of components and sub-components. It is particularly relevant to the current and future performance of the mainstreaming strategy.

181. In the lead in to the implementation of this evaluation some stakeholders had questions about how the project sat within the broad spectrum of GoR policies targeting social and economic development that are of relevance to the objectives of DDR. The project is enhanced by the virtue of its implementation through the RDRC and its alignment with, and relevance to social and economic policies such as EDPRS 2. MINALOC is very clear on the relationship between itself, the RDRC and other sister agencies involved in social protection (FARG, NCPD, and LODA), with the RDRC being autonomous and at the same rank as an affiliated agency in social protection.

182. The RDRC as the implementing social protection agency for ex-combatants realises via programming the policy and strategy formulated by MINALOC. It is part of the sector working group and along with the DGs of MINALOC and FARG, NCPD and LODA holds weekly coordination meetings to align the work of all agencies and to inform the development of social protection under the ministry.

183. As such the project benefits from the RDRC's position in relation to MINALOC and the other social protection agencies. It is part of what appears to be a coherent and collaborative social protection sector. The subsidiary effects of RDRC's work on overall social protection and social cohesion are likely to be positively enhanced through coordination and collaboration with the ministry and the other partner agencies.

184. Furthermore, it should be hoped that the RDRC can use its position within MINALOC to collaborate with other social protection agencies to devise ways to target the two groups identified in the 2015 batch of studies that appear most at risk: (i) the cohort of ex-combatants in acute deprivation, and (ii) disabled civilians.

185. Findings from the 2015 Tracer identified the cohort of ex-combatants enduring acute deprivation to be approximately 15.0 percent of all ex-combatants. Given the RDRC is in receipt of the data from 2015 it can further investigate the life circumstances of this cohort. As the 2015 Tracer concluded, year on year there has been a significant increase in those apparently trapped in acute deprivation and thus unable to work their way out into successful income generating projects. This should be a priority for the RDRC.

186. As is tracked throughout the 2014 CDS, disabled civilians are consistently worse off both economically and socially than their ex-combatant counterparts. This represents an ideal opportunity for the RDRC to share its successes working with disabled ex-combatants with a view to mainstreaming comparable supports in other agencies for civilians with disabilities.

187. Regarding mainstreaming (Section 3.6 below), the position of the RDRC under MINALOC illustrates how the exit strategy for the donors from the SEDRP is rarely referred to as mainstreaming by the RDRC and its partners; rather the emphasis is on universal access to

benefits. From the perspective of the line ministry, the RDRC and the project (particularly through its emphasis on provision of *Mutuelle de Santé* to eligible ex-combatants, the GoR funded component providing housing to disabled ex-combatants and the filtering of ex-combatants into mainstream psychiatric and medical care via the MRU) has long been engaged in facilitating ‘universal access to benefits’ and coordinating this facilitation with GoR policy and other agencies.

188. **Buy-in from the GoR.** The project has benefited from buy-in from the GoR which builds on the alignment of DDR programming under the broad social protection sector (as discussed above). Unlike some DDR projects in neighbouring countries where there is little financial or ideological buy-in by government (Uganda for example) or where DDR Commissions are under non-social sector line ministries (Republic of South Sudan, for example), the project has been supported by the GoR structurally and through government financial commitment and borrowing under the current financing agreement which ensures the running of the RDRC and to implement complementary activities to SEDRP including constructing homes for eligible disabled ex-combatants and Integrated Rehabilitation Workshops.

189. The level of buy-in from the GoR appears to be captured in the commitment to finance the RDRC post-SEDRP and through creating the draft legal framework for such continuation. The Law ‘Establishing the Rwanda Demobilization Commission (RDRC) and Determining its Responsibilities, Organisation and Functioning (Unsigned)’<sup>106</sup> draws on a session of the Rwandan parliament on 19<sup>th</sup> November 2014 to establish the RDRC, its position under supervision by the Ministry in charge of Social Affairs and set out a range of relevant articles including Mission, responsibilities, management, staffing, Commissioners. The same law is accompanied by a new organisational structure for the RDRC and salary scales as communicated to the RDRC by the Ministry of Public Service and Labour in correspondence dated August 6<sup>th</sup> 2014.<sup>107</sup>

190. In summary, the project has benefited from GoR commitment in the form of counterpart financing of activities, entering into lending agreement for the current AF and through the underwriting of the continuation of the RDRC post-SEDRP thus increasing the likelihood that impact from the SEDRP will be consolidated and that missed opportunities or poor programming will be corrected.

191. **Comprehensive communications strategy including with MONUSCO.** As noted below the project is negatively affected by the lack of return of ex-AGs from the DRC. Where a mass return is anticipated in project documentation the reality is a trickle-in of between 50 and 70 ex-AGs per quarter.

192. It is highly likely that the continued trickle-in is facilitated by the project’s communications activities that are driven by the current strategy and delivered partially in partnership with MONUSCO. The communications strategy is innovative and builds on the traditional approach of utilising radio programming (in the case of the SEDRP via weekly Radio Rwanda broadcasts, quarterly interactive radio talk shows and affiliated broadcasts into DRC) and facilitated peer-to-peer telephone communications with dedicated handsets for Mutobo and Muhoza) and VOIP services via skype that are made available to FDLR in DRC through a laptop computer hosted in markets frequented by FDLR. While the efficacy of the strategy is not

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<sup>106</sup> GoR, 2014.

<sup>107</sup> MIFOTRA, 2014 (Correspondence).

reviewed in depth it would be worthwhile including a focus on communications in future quantitative surveying by or for the RDRC's annual Tracer and PVS.

**Strong policy alignment with key social policies, particularly relating to gender and disability.** For the project its strong alignment with key social policies are likely to increase the sustainability of impacts. The project has a strong gender approach that is fully implemented. In addition: (i) Gender is a topic that goes beyond women's issues, and the project takes a strong gender approach with both men and women beneficiaries (IMAGES study, work with men on gender in PDOP, work on mental health with men to facilitate peaceful gender coexistence – including through anger management and conflict mitigation, etc), (ii) The project has a strong focus on women, and they receive specific and tailored support, including through automatic qualification for VSW support.

193. At the level of policy, the RDRC is aligned with the GoR social policies including those under MINALOC targeting vulnerable groups and those under MIGEPROF (such as gender as a cross cutting theme in all priority areas of EDPRS 2). The evaluation, however, has not studied how the requirement to mainstream gender in all budgets as per Budget Law Article 64 is realised by the RDRC.

194. The project through its design (Section 2.6) and emphasis on gender and disability benefits from being a part of a large policy shift between EDPRS and EDPRS 2. By aligning with this policy, the outcomes for vulnerable groups should be better sustained. However, as with all policy shifts the challenge will be in its implementation.

195. **Flexibility to allow reaction to opportunities to improve services to returning ex-AGs and their dependents particularly through the mini-PDOP and attempts to expand the coverage of mental health screening through the work of the MRU.** Effectively, the SEDRP is an old project: its own dedicated timeline originates in 2009 but its heritage stretches back to the turn of the century. As such it is part of a long evolution of DDR in Rwanda which on the whole has been characterised by positive reviews and strong performance.

196. Over time, the project has shown an ability to react to emerging challenges or opportunities such as delivering reinsertion support to the families of demobilizing ex-AG (THK and PDOP services). It has led psychosocial interventions in DDR in the region and currently it is in the process of up-skilling staff at the MRU.

197. However, while the project has been flexible to react to some emerging challenges it remains slow to do so and there are legitimate questions regarding capacity and service delivery in some areas, particularly as they pertain to psychosocial supports and to challenging sub-groups such as former child ex-combatants.

198. In the case of psychosocial support, the project set up the MRU in 2003 and fully developed to its current configuration by 2008. The psychosocial supports available through the MRU as they currently exist (screening, pharmacological and therapeutic treatment) have been developed following the 2012 national conference on psychosocial support. However, the level of demand and detection and the capacity of the MRU to comprehensively meet demand is unclear. Despite psychosocial support in their current form being in place for three years it is only recently that PTSD screening at reception is mandatory for ex-combatants.

199. In general, the MRU appears to lack effective record keeping, communications and follow-up systems including regarding those patients that have been mainstreamed. Staffing at the unit is limited (1 x medical doctor/psychiatrist, 4 x psychologists and 3 x medical nurses) and they must work across Muhoza and Mutobo on often complex cases. Challenges such as staff

burnout and provision of appropriate support (such as peer supervision) are clearly evident and should be a concern to the RDRC if it wishes the MRU to be effective in the future. Further, there are challenges about how to integrate supports for the physical rehabilitation of disabled ex-combatants with psychosocial supports, particularly when the centre lacks capacity in physical rehabilitation.

200. However, it is clear that the MRU is functioning and is busy but it is very difficult if not impossible to get a clear and accurate picture of the demand for services, particularly regarding psychosocial treatment. While the fact that it exists is positive, it should be noted that while comparatively the project has performed well in the area of psychosocial rehabilitation and services there is little to which to compare the psychosocial component to as most DDR in the region is devoid of meaningful psychosocial support. Therefore, there is room for improving this aspect of the project.

201. Regarding those factors negatively influencing the achievement of the project outcomes, the following are the findings of the evaluation.

202. **Arguably the most significant factor or set of factors negatively influencing the performance of the project are those preventing the return of ex-AG from the DRC to the extent that the project has repeatedly anticipated.** Throughout the Bank project documentation from 2009 to the first AF and then the second AF, the return of FDLR is the overriding logic to extend the project. However, as is clear from the RDRC's own MIS, the rate of return is much lower and more gradual than anticipated. This fact does not underestimate the rate of return and does not ignore how the project finances activities delivered not just to newly demobilized ex-combatants and their dependents but also to those already demobilized, in the reintegration period or who have come to the attention of the RDRC through its community-based structures such as the health animators. Rather it is a clear statement of fact that the main driver of the need for the SEDRP is not a reality.

203. There are a broad set of factors mitigating against the planned-for and prioritised return of ex-AGs from DRC which are all largely outside the control of the project. Activities such as those implemented under the communications strategy and critically the overall successful implementation of reintegration of ex-combatants as is documented in the 2015 Tracer and CDS are all important achievements that contribute to creating a 'pull' factor for ex-AGs. However, as long as insecurity, the geopolitical dynamics of Rwanda, DRC and its neighbours and what is widely acknowledged in Rwanda as an ineffective UN mission in DRC persist, mass demobilisation of FDLR is unlikely to occur. Other regionally destabilising factors such as the current conflict in Burundi and the approaching constitutional questions in Rwanda prior to the 2016 elections are likely to contribute to mitigating any mass return of AGs from DRC.

204. At the time of the evaluation there is little clear indication of how or when the ex-AGs in DRC will return to Rwanda. The UN has a renewed mandate for operations in DRC which reiterates "its deep concern regarding the security and humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC due to ongoing destabilizing activities of foreign and domestic armed groups, and stress[es] the importance of neutralizing the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the National Liberation

Forces (FNL), and all other armed groups in the DRC...”<sup>108</sup> However, there is little movement on physically engaging the FDLR or encouraging orderly demobilization.

205. In reality, dislodging the FDLR is a formidable challenge for MONUSCO with its Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) which had successes against M23 in the past. The FDLR is considered “a well-entrenched rebel group which has become part of the landscape in eastern DRC over the last 20 years, and which has social and economic links to the civilian population as well as to Congolese government and military officials”<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, the FDLR is said to be re-organizing and re-strategising to resist the ever pending military interventions of the UN or Congolese forces, when and if they happen. Strategies such as disguising military identity, blending into local civilian populations, storing weapons and removing rank and file to remote locations<sup>110</sup> signal that any demobilization will not occur in the short term.

**Limitations either through human capacity or other factors on services provided to some vulnerable groups particularly former child ex-combatants.** The project aims to have a specific focus on pre-determined vulnerable groups (female, child and disabled ex-combatants) but it is in two of these sub-groups that the project appears to have the most challenges.<sup>111</sup> These challenges appear to originate in a variety of factors including unclear staff capacity including through the knock-on effects of staff churn or reassignment (former child-combatants). Nevertheless, they receive separate and tailored support, incomparable with other DDR programs. The only challenge is with follow-up, an issue that the Bank has insisted on, and for which the project has made much progress. Important to also keep in mind on this issue, that the project following up on children is in any case a duplication of what the ICRC already does for all these children.

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207. It is challenging for the evaluation to definitively pin-down the issues at play. However, some lessons from the field are clear. As seen above the cohort of females in the project is very small and as such it is difficult for the project to deliver a special focus on females unless it devises a means to better assess the social and economic performance of female ex-combatants and/or female dependents with a view to devising concrete programming interventions. Current tools for assessing the success or otherwise of the reintegration of female ex-combatants (Tracer and CDS) are inadequate given the challenge of accessing the population. A more nuanced approach is required, one which is likely to be qualitative in methodology to examine the social and economic situation of female ex-combatants and female dependents over an extended period of time (minimum 12 to 18 months).

208. It should be noted that the recent LOGiCA family study highlighted the challenges faced by the spouses of ex-RDF and ex-AGs as well as other issues including some relating to mental health. These findings should clearly inform and research into the situation of female ex-combatants and female dependents in comparison to civilians of similar demographic profiles. Any research should have a clear programmatic focus devising programmatic interventions if needed that could improve outcomes for females.

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<sup>108</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 2211 (2015) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7415th meeting, on 26 March 2015.

<sup>109</sup> <http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/extending-the-fdlr-disarmament-deadline-will-only-prolong-the-agoy>

<sup>110</sup> <http://www.issafrica.org/events/how-the-fdlr-plans-to-avoid-military-defeat>

<sup>111</sup> World Bank 2009, 2014.

209. Regarding former child combatants the project is struggling to implement appropriate follow-up and monitoring and to assist adequately in the social and economic reintegration of this cohort of ex-combatants. Former child combatants follow a dedicated programmatic pathway towards reintegration accessing various reinsertion and reintegration support depending on preference and circumstance including a brief return to formal education. However, how they fare after completing the programme is unclear. While quantitative indicators are positive, former child combatants like other ex-combatants fault the RDRC with providing insufficient follow up monitoring and advice to help them maximize the outcomes of the programmatic support.

210. Former child combatants largely go without systematic follow-up by the Project or by other agencies in the arena such as the ICRC. It is clear that the project vis-à-vis the RDRC is struggling with how and for how long to engage former child ex-combatants. Effectively the RDRC is struggling with implementing a solid follow-up mechanism and with deciding what support (in addition to those already provided through the SEDRP) would benefit former child soldiers with an understanding of how to support former child soldiers (as crystallised in the current pilot mentorship programme) and for how long to support former child soldiers.

211. There are few knowledge resources on the intensely local or personal situation of former child combatants in Rwanda to guide the project. Therefore, other than the assumption that former child soldiers are a vulnerable group and the interventions derived from standard DDR programming there is little framework for engagement. In other locations where longitudinal studies have been conducted, it has been found that former child soldiers reintegrate economically and socially successfully but carry the “psychological distress” of their experiences as a combatant leading them to more solitary lives and symptoms of psychosocial disorders.<sup>112</sup> Thus, skilling the MRU, community health animators and mainstream mental health service providers to better target former child combatants could be a starting point for better support to this cohort of ex-combatants.

212. Further, it is worthwhile noting that while the caseload of arriving ex-AG is low, the whole purpose of health animators is to assist in the detection and referral of mental health issues with ex-combatants who are reintegrated in the community. What is clear is that within the community there can be very little knowledge of how to deal with mental health challenges including PTSD. For example, when family members of ex-AF and ex-AG were asked how they helped the ex-combatant deal with their psychological issues, the majority only ‘listened to her/him’ (49.6 percent) or prayed for her/him (38.1 percent). Only 1.8 percent brought the ex-combatant to a hospital and only 1.8 percent brought them to an NGO for help.<sup>113</sup> Clearly much is going undetected and there is room for better sensitisation and detection in the community.

213. **Challenges regarding accountability, monitoring and implementation in a context of scaling down DDR programming and scaling up social protection programming: in other words the problem of the question where does DDR end and social protection begin?** This complex discussion relates to the phase of the SEDRP, the wind-down of the Project and the continuation of the RDRC under a renewed GoR mandate.

214. As noted above, the project has a long heritage and given the reduced flow of ex-AGs it is being prepared for completion by June 2016. As also noted above, concurrently the RDRC is

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<sup>112</sup> Boothby, 2006.

<sup>113</sup> Specht, 2014: 5

being prepared for continuation under its renewed GoR mandate. With a reduced influx and a gradual thinning of the cohort of ex-combatants receiving support at the end of their time with the DDR programme, the question facing the Commission is for how long to engage ex-combatants. This question is linked to the bigger question as to when DDR programming tapers out and social protection assumes responsibility for ex-combatants and in particular those denoted as ‘vulnerable’.

215. As things stand, the project fails to follow-up with former child ex-combatants but this lack of follow-up is characterised by second guessing for how long follow-up is actually needed and when follow-up from the RDRC crosses-over from support to harming the ex-combatant. The project implementer is aware of the potential of labels such as ‘former child-soldier’ to cause harm and impact on the perceptions of self by those so labelled. Consequently, the project appears somewhat ‘stuck’ as it tries to figure out the best approach and one in line with principles of Do No Harm.

216. Similarly in the case of disabled or traumatised ex-combatants who are provided with services by the MRU. Once these cases are referred into the mainstream, all monitoring of case-specific progress stops. The outcomes for these particular cases are not tracked and there is a vague hope that dynamics will be detected by Tracer studies or through the health animator network but there is no evidence of this being the case. But again, the project is situated such that as a DDR project it is required to have boundaries – some designated by time limitations, some by those pertaining to adherence to Do No Harm approaches so it remains undecided as to for how long and in .

217. This technical struggle over for how long and in what way to monitor the progress of cases is exacerbated by the fact that the SEDRP is winding down and the RDRC is beginning to consider its new work plan for the post-SEDRP period.

218. While the RDRC grapples with this discussion, the end result is that presently there is little knowledge of outcomes for female ex-combatants and former child-combatants, particularly regarding psychosocial issues and recidivism as well as outcomes for those ex-combatants who have entered mainstream treatment for physiological and psychological issues.

## **2.6 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry**

219. Project preparation and design and quality at entry are rated **satisfactory**. They were responsive to the GoR policy frameworks at the time of project effectiveness (2009) and at the time of the first and second AFs. Specifically the original project aligned with the priorities of EDPRS-1 particularly in the areas of social protection where EDPRS-1 planned: (i) to extend coverage of vulnerable persons by social safety nets from 12 percent to 20 percent, (ii) to ensure that 38 percent of vulnerable people graduating from livelihood enhancement schemes achieve economic independence, (iii) to ensure that *mutuelles de santé* coverage extends to all target groups.<sup>114</sup>

220. EDPRS-1 aimed to ensure that evidence based social protection policy-making and implementation occurred in MINALOC and that CSOs regularly evaluated their own and MINALOC’s social protection activities.<sup>115</sup> As an agency under MINALOC, the RDRC falls

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<sup>114</sup> GoR, 2008: 42.

<sup>115</sup> GoR, 2008: 43.

between these two strands. However, the project's emphasis on M&E and MIS systems (despite the challenges through the years, see Section 2.7) illustrates the emphasis placed on evidence-based activities in the SEDRP.

221. With the extension of the Project it has aligned with the GoR's EDPRS 2 particularly given the focus on disability and gender mainstreaming both of which are cross-cutting themes in the EDPRS 2. In particular the Project is relevant to: Priority 2 Improving service delivery thread Rule of law, unity and reconciliation, security and stability (including regional peace and stability)<sup>116</sup> as well as the Cross Cutting Issues (CCI) of: (i) Gender and family (reducing poverty levels among men and women, malnutrition, gender based violence and other related conflicts at both family and community level), and (ii) Disability & Social Inclusion include ensuring accessible infrastructure and information for people with disabilities.<sup>117</sup>

222. The project has aligned with GoR's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) and Social Protection Implementation Planning (SPIP). In particular this alignment has been with key projected outcomes for the Social Protection Sector; namely: (i) Outcome 3: *Increased coverage of gender-sensitive social protection programmes that support the provision of a minimum income for families*, and (ii) Outcome 6: *Social development and complementary programmes to social protection implemented that support family and community efforts to move out of poverty*. It has achieved this alignment by emphasising activities and support to and outcomes for female ex-combatants as well as the dependents of ex-combatant and through the focus on the economic development of ex-combatants.

223. The project has been responsive to the requests of the GoR and through its implementing agency (RDRC) has strongly facilitated national ownership of DDR programming in Rwanda. The project has aligned with the GoR's responsibilities under the Arusha Accords.

224. In its original design, the Project aligned with the then World Bank 2002 - 2006 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) which highlighted reintegration of ex-combatants as a crucial step to development. With the project extensions particularly AF 2, there is alignment with the 2014 – 2018 Country Partnership Strategy which, while not highlighting DDR and rather positioning reintegration of ex-combatants to a strand of programming for vulnerable groups, continues to emphasize demobilization of AGs in DRC as a contributing to the “prerequisite for regional integration and cross-border investment”, namely regional peace and security.<sup>118</sup>

225. The project has aligned with with principles of Do No Harm/Conflict Sensitivity and consciously looks for opportunities to mitigate potential negative effects of the project as well as to find means to implement programming based on project learning. The Project has been compliant with the 10 Fragile States Principles subscribed to by OECD/DAC donors particularly Principle 1: *Take context as a starting point*, and Principle 6: *Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies*.

226. It should be noted that particularly the project aligns with Principle 9: *Act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance*. The project is a continuation of assistance to the GoR in DDR that stretches back to the RDRP. By continuing that engagement it has aligned with

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<sup>116</sup> GoR, 2013: 19 - 20.

<sup>117</sup> GoR, 2013: 21.

<sup>118</sup> World Bank, 2014: 41.

the need to assist in the development of what has become a core institution (the RDRC) over the period of engagement.

227. The project has aligned with the World Bank approach to fragility and conflict as contained in WDR 2011 and with regional policy on stabilisation and development: *Reviving the Great Lakes Region: Regional Initiative on Peace, Stability and Economic Development*.

228. By design, at entry the project was satisfactorily identified, prepared and appraised so as to meet its PDO. The revised project activities since the AF 2 address short fallings in the previous iteration of the project. The project does not sufficiently name and examine the external (including regional) and internal (socio-political) factors mitigating the demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of ex-AGs from DRC.

## 2.7 Monitoring and Evaluation

The evaluation rates the M&E of the project as **modest**. While by design the project M&E is strong, there have been significant shortcomings in the M&E systems implementation over time particularly concerning measuring project impact.

The M&E quality rating is based on an assessment of three main elements: (i) M&E design as reflected in the project design and proposed methodologies mapped out in the documents; (ii) M&E implementation as reflected in the actual project M&E inputs and the methodologies applied over the period of project effectiveness; and (iii) M&E utilization as reflected in the changes made in the on-going project, or as reflected in attributable changes made in subsequent interventions.

229. Regarding M&E design', the project was designed with a Results Framework that was appropriately updated during the AF 2 to reflect additions to components and where relevant issues specific to PDO indicators. Revisions appear to have been authored following consultation between the RDRC and the Bank over the lifetime of the project. The project results frameworks have included comparative data (percentages or numbers) which, depending on the indicator can span back to 2009 and the sources of data have been intended to be comprehensive assessments of programme achievements over time in the form of annual Tracer, PVS and CDS as well as project evaluations all of which are under the purvue of the RDRC.

230. The evaluation finds that by design indicators have been clear and practical and by design the project has ensured a baseline plus successive and appropriate studies in the form of annual Tracers, PVS and CDS. These studies appear to have been owned by the RDRC and RDRC management remains committed to learning from project M&E and finding ways to improve project design or other work in the RDRC.

231. The main challenges regarding M&E have stemmed from implementation and the contemporaneity of data in the MIS. Fundamentally, M&E implementation pertains to what extent input, output, outcome and impact evidence is actually collected and analysed in a methodologically sound manner. Over the lifetime of the project, data collection has been split between the internal MIS, the data collected in the quantitative studies and the data collected in third party studies such as through the LOGiCA family study or the Promundo International Men and Gender Equality Survey.

232. The internal MIS appears to have had challenges with data and the architecture, some of which can be anticipated but some of which cannot be avoided, particularly, deterioration of

contemporaneity of data. Data pertaining to a live population quickly becomes out of date and its usefulness deteriorates and this has been seen in challenges encountered by successive Tracer, PVS and CDS studies when trying to locate respondents. Apart from the central MIS, other data storage such as that used by the MRU appears incomplete or only partially functional. In the case of the MRU, during a field visit by the evaluation there was no internet connectivity and data on case loads and case details could not be provided to the evaluation team.

233. Regarding the collection of successive years of data the quality of studies conducted for the RDRC over time has been patchy at best. This challenge with quality stems from a number of sources including routine but difficult field challenges during the implementation of studies, successive changes in quantitative tools that make historical comparison of results unreliable, quality of consultancies who implement the study, and very poor efficiency establishing the conditions for studies to be implemented, namely delays in contracting consultants to implement studies meaning that the data is always late.

234. Regarding the use of M&E data, certainly M&E results on project outputs or activities in the form of quarterly reports and annual reporting are made available to the relevant stakeholders. However, as with impact assessments internal reporting over time is inconsistent in quality. Certainly while donors have had faith that the project has performed well, none can identify or clearly say in detail what has happened year on year or begin to gauge the social return on their contributions.

235. Finally, as the project draws to a close, the current datasets measuring project impact show good economic and social performance of ex-combatants now and over time. Gaps in the analysis are mainly those associated with females (due to the low numbers of female respondents) and in certain areas those associated with former child ex-combatants. While these knowledge gaps could be bridged, any attribution of resources should match the need for analysis. In the case of female ex-combatants (n28), new demobilizations over the time period covered by this evaluation is not a justification for increasing M&E activities to focus solely on female ex-combatants. Arguably, the data can be augmented through a review of the LOGiCA data on female ex-combatants and spouses but more so, as the project draws to a close, the longer term welfare of female ex-combatants (as with all ex-combatants) may legitimately be more of a focus of mainstream social protection services and not DDR.

## **2.7 Safeguards including Environmental and Fiduciary Compliance**

236. Project documentation identifies the project triggers safeguards regarding Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 401) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). The evaluation can confirm that sub-projects are screened by the RDRC for environmental and social impacts and given that sub-projects are exempt from the preparation of ESMPs more limited checklists are utilised by the implementer.

237. Regarding environmental safeguards the project comes under the supervision of Rwanda Environmental Management Authority (REMA). REMA has the responsibility of assisting the RDRC to implement its environmental management projects. In doing so REMA assists in the capacity building of RDRC staff in environmental management with the most recent input being in March 2015 where training was delivered in Environmental Laws and Policies, Environmental Impact Assessment, Environmental Degradation, Climate Change, and Eco-Friendly IGA.

238. Also, REMA assists in the screening of small grant projects as per GoR regulations to ensure environmental friendliness of these projects. From REMA district evaluation facilitators

ensure the monitoring of the environmental compliance of activities implemented by the RDRC including those under the SEDRP. The RDRC and therefore, the activities under the SEDRP fall under the Social Protection Sector, an environmental checklist is in preparation at the time of writing.

239. The evaluation did not review fiduciary compliance and has not been in receipt of audit reports. However, the evaluation notes that as per project documentation there has been no issues with recent audits.<sup>119</sup>

240. Regarding involuntary resettlement, the evaluation has witnessed no evidence of same and this is confirmed by the findings of the 2015 PVS which indicates that 95.9 percent of ex-combatants identify that they freely chose their community of resettlement.

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<sup>119</sup> World Bank, 2014: 6.

### 3. Assessment of Outcomes at time of MTR

#### 3.1 Relevance of Objectives and Design

241. The relevance of the project objectives is rated **high**. Similarly the relevance of project design is rated **high**. The project’s objectives and design have been relevant to: (i) EDPRS and EDPRS 2; (ii) GoR’s National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) and Social Protection Implementation Planning (SPIP); (iii) GoR responsibilities under the Arusha Accords; (iv) the recurring needs of ex-combatants and their families in the context of time-limited DDR programming; (v) national ownership as a pillar of DDR, and (vi) the Bank 2002 – 2006 CAS and current 2014 – 2018 CPS.

242. Largely, at the time of evaluation the project objectives remain valid. However, the first objective (Demobilize members of armed groups or Rwandan origin and members of the Rwandan Defence Forces) is partially redundant given the completion of demobilization of RDF. RDF are now managed through a separate SSR/Veterans process outside the project.

243. The second objective (Provide socioeconomic reintegration support to said members following demobilization with a particular focus on female, child and disabled ex-combatants) remains valid if at a much lower demand than originally envisaged in the project design. Activities and outputs per component (as examined Section 1 and 2 this report) have remained consistent with the progress towards the attainment of objectives. To date there have been no documented significant negative or unintended effects of the project.

244. In its design, the project activities have been relevant to the project objectives with a clear logical framework between inputs and outcomes. Objectives have been clearly stated both during the original project design and through the AFs with a clear line of cause and effect between project financing and project outcomes. However, it remains the case that the exogenous factors in DRC preventing the return of ex-AGs to Rwanda should have been more comprehensively explored in project documentation. That said, the communications strategy of the project implementer and the overall positive impact of the project over time contributes to the pull factor for ex-AGs capable of return and willing to return from DRC.

#### 3.2 Efficiency

245. The Project efficiency in progress made towards achieving its PDO is unrated because the evaluation has not been in receipt of all relevant data (particularly narrative audit reports and full breakdown of category 1 expenses for all quarters between Q1 2013 and Q1 2015). Because of challenges identifying project expenditure on supports and services to ex-combatants it is not possible to reliably calculate cost per beneficiary.

**Table 4. Category 1 Expenditure**

Q/Yr	Rwf
1/2013	540,397,204
2/2013	833,642,116
3/2013	224,194,846
4/2013	645,185,989
1/2014	123,277,295
2/2014	Unknown – average for year: 316,155,467
3/2014	310,621,913
4/2014	413,929,342
1/2015	223,915,147
Total	3,631,319,319 (US\$5,187,599 exchange 1:700)

Source: RDRC Finance Department (electronic correspondence)

246. If Category 1 expenditure was made only to those who have been demobilized since 2009 then the cost per beneficiary could be very roughly estimated at US\$8,169 which would compare very unfavourably to other programmes in the region: the PNDDR (DRC) cost per beneficiary was US\$1,817<sup>120</sup>; the cost of the RDRP (Rwanda) was US\$2,065<sup>121</sup> and Burundi \$2,775<sup>122</sup> If the additional 400 ex-combatants who were eligible to receive support under the second AF are added then the cost per beneficiary reduces but not enough to represent an efficient project: US\$5,012 per beneficiary.

247. Any figure for cost per beneficiary should also note the good cost efficiencies of the project in utilising mainstream service providers for education, vocational training, medical screening and medical and psychosocial treatment of ex-combatants. There is good added-value when utilising existing infrastructure and it contributes to the mainstreaming of project activities and services to ex-combatants.

248. In conclusion, two other aspects can be noted here. First, Bank disbursement to the project has been prompt and without challenges for the recipient. Second, donors have questioned the cost-effectiveness of Bank supervision of the project mainly regarding the cost of supervisory missions. Bank supervision of the project (not just missions) has amounted to US\$1,217,102.11 over the lifetime of the project however this includes all costs such as staff time not just mission related expense.<sup>123</sup>

### 3.3 Effectiveness and Efficacy

249. *Effectiveness* is the extent to which the project achieved its planned for outputs. The project outputs are those defined in Section 1 above ranging from payment and benefits to communications and reporting. The project is both predominantly demand-led: demand for services and benefits (outputs) is based on the numbers demobilized (with or without dependents) and the demand for other support services such as medical and psychological interventions via the MRU. The project effectiveness in progress made towards achieving its PDO is rated **substantial** because (i) the project has met the demand for demobilization; (ii) has performed moderately well in the timely and accurate provision of reinsertion and reintegration supports, and (iii) the project's planned for outputs based on the mass return of ex-AGs from DRC were not realised due to return being a trickle-in, (iv) efficiency and quality challenges with project M&E, and (v) based on lower rates of disbursement of essential items or delays experienced by ex-combatants as identified above and in the 2015 PVS.

250. The RDRC identifies that it consistently meets demand for demobilization and those 'recyclers' or ineligible individuals (civilians, foreign ex-combatants) are dealt with in accordance with either the social protection mechanisms in Rwanda or the formal procedures for return to the country of origin. This has not been confirmed by the evaluation.

251. The major factor in the consideration of outputs is what planned for outputs were not realised. For the SEDRP the main planned-for and beneficiary-orientated outputs that went unrealised were the benefits and services to be provided to the cohort of ex-AGs that have failed to demobilize from within DRC.

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<sup>120</sup>ICR ICR00002168 DRC IDA-H0890 IDA-H3620 TF-54242, pp. 28-29.

<sup>121</sup>ICR00001169 Rwanda IDA-36340, IDA-3634A, TF-52159, pp. 19-22, 31-43.

<sup>122</sup>ICR00001169 Burundi IDA-H076, TF-53794, pp.26-28.

<sup>123</sup> Lemasle, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2015 (Correspondence).

252. Regarding provision of demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration supports the PVS found that the RDRC proceeded with reinsertion and reintegration payments and benefits as prescribed in the project documents, and confirmed that benefits were disbursed to ex-combatants. These benefits included BNK, RSA, RG, VSW and THK. The 2015 PVS found that 98.0 percent of the ex-combatants had received at least one of the listed benefits; n10 of the n505 respondents had not yet received one of the five listed benefits at the time of survey.

253. However, far fewer PVS survey respondents were successful in obtaining essential items at the demobilization center. While the majority of the sample reported receiving a demobilization ID card (86.8 percent), only 62 percent reported receiving a national ID number. In total, 58.7 percent of the ex-RPA/ex-RDF compared to 65.1 percent of the ex-AG obtained a national ID number (Q5.1.7). In total, 75.0 percent of ex-AF compared to 92.0% of the ex-AG obtained the Demobilisation ID Card at the demobilisation centres (Q5.2.4).

254. In total, 70.9 percent of ex-combatants received a discharge letter and 54.9 percent reported receiving essential items such as a blanket. Other essential items were received as follows: soap (53.3 percent), a sleeping mat (43.4 percent), and medicine (32.0 percent), with the ex-AF sub-group reporting the lowest numbers.

255. Despite many participants reporting having not received essential items only a minority of those surveyed reported critical need for improvement in the program.<sup>124</sup> Of those who indicated that some level of improvement was necessary, the most often cited area of improvement was medical care services (37.2 percent), followed closely by housing and accommodation (36.0 percent), career guidance (30.3 percent), meals (30.0 percent), psychological counseling (28.8 percent), reproductive or sexual health care services (27.8 percent), sanitation (24.1 percent), drinking water (22.7 percent), and bathing water (20.5 percent).

256. Aside from beneficiary-orientated outputs, those from services to ex-combatants and their dependents) the project experienced challenges with the quality of project monitoring and evaluation outputs, principally Tracer, CDS and PVS (Section 2.7) and some internal M&E.

257. *Efficacy* is defined as the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance and attribution to project activities. The PDO of the project has been to support the efforts of the Recipient (GoR) to (i) demobilize members of AGs of Rwandan origin and members of the Rwandan Defence Force, and (ii) provide economic reintegration support to said members following demobilization, with a particular focus on the provision of such support to female, child and disabled ex-combatants.

258. The project efficacy is rated **substantial** because: (i) the project has supported the GoR via the RDRC to demobilize all eligible RDF; (ii) the project has supported the GoR to

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<sup>124</sup> The PVS found that the reported rate of receipt for essential items was generally much lower: demobilization ID card issuance (86.8 percent), discharge letter (70.9 percent), blanket (54.9 percent), soap (53.3 percent), sleeping mat (43.4 percent), and medicine (32.0 percent). Ex-AF respondents reported the lowest numbers (74.8 percent of Ex-AF received the demobilization ID card; 62.2 percent received the discharge letter; 10.3 percent, blanket; 17.6, soap; 10.4 percent, sleeping mat; 21.4 percent, medicine). According to the RDRC, there has been a tendency of reluctance to collect all items on the discharge day knowing that they can return to collect them in the future. The RDRC also cautions that respondents may have offered such responses based on a speculative expectation of more supplies.

demobilize some members of AGs of Rwandan origin but a number estimated at between 2000 and 3000 combatants and their dependents remain in DRC; (iii) the project successfully provided economic reintegration supports to 4,000 RDF and 4,280 ex-AG and their dependents in the period under evaluation, and (iv) the project has had a particular focus on disabled ex-combatants including through partnering GoR financing of residential housing and Integrated Rehabilitation Workshops, and (v) the project has had a focus on former child ex-combatants through the provision of services aligned with the IDDRS standard practice of DDR for youth but it has not adequately followed up on former child ex-combatants (socially or economically).

259. As has been discussed, the PDO is phrased thus that it is difficult to measure: terminology such as ‘support the efforts’ are without specific measurements including through the intended project outcomes (Section 1). That said during the period under evaluation the project has completed all DDR activity with the expected cohort of RDF and has delivered a variety of economic supports to ex-AGs of Rwandan origin, and in the current AF, to their dependents.

260. In terms of achieving its PDO, the project performance is challenged primarily due to the lack of return of ex-AGs and the low numbers of female ex-combatants processed through the SEDRP. Regarding former child-ex-combatants, while appropriate services have been delivered through the SEDRP, there remains challenges about how and when to follow-up with this cohort of ex-combatants which at the time of writing persist as challenges for the implementing agent.

### **3.6 Sustainability and Mainstreaming**

261. Sustainability is concerned with whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding is withdrawn. Sustainability can relate to: (i) the project itself (SEDRP), (ii) project outcomes, and (iii) project impacts. Any focus on the sustainability of outcomes and impact should be based on a coalescence of factors including the external environment and impact on beneficiaries. Mainstreaming is included in this section of the evaluation as it is the key programmatic approach to ensure the sustainability of project activities after the completion of the donor cycle or close of the project as well as a way to draw on complementary mainstream programming to maximize impact of the SDERP. The efficacy, coherence and relevance of the mainstreaming strategy influences the rating for the sustainability of the project.

262. The sustainability of the project is rated **substantial** because: (i) the GoR has committed in legislation to continue the work of the RDRC post-SEDRP; (ii) successive Tracer and CDS studies have returned a positive picture for the reintegration of ex-combatants indicating that the positive impact of the project is stable and the most recent assessment shows ex-combatants performing well economically and socially; (iii) the project strongly aligns with other GoR social protection policy and programming; (iv) while the GoR has committed to continue the work of the RDRC at the time of evaluation it is not clear what this means for the continuation of activities from the SEDRP or the focus of the project: a work-plan has not been created by the RDRC as of yet; (v) the highly uncertain external environment principally, (a) continuing conflict in DRC and the failure of MONUSCO to tackle the FDLR; (b) possible social and political ‘contagion’ from the breakdown in order and attempted coup in Burundi; (c) the underlying tension in Rwanda regarding a possible constitutional amendment and extension of presidential term.

263. As outlined above (Section 2.5) The Law ‘Establishing the Rwanda Demobilization Commission (RDRC) and Determining its Responsibilities, Organisation and Functioning’ (unsigned)<sup>125</sup> and the new organisational structure for the RDRC and salary scales as communicated to the RDRC by the Ministry of Public Service and Labour in correspondence dated August 6<sup>th</sup> 2014<sup>126</sup> both provide the legislative and policy framework for the continuation of the RDRC. However, until an activity plan and budgeting are completed (and in the case of the latter, accepted) the reality of post-June 2016 is opaque at best.

264. Despite the project learning from previous iterations including the RDRP, at the time the project became effective (2009) and during the time addressed in this evaluation (2012-2015) for the project, some aspects of the external environment have been persistent ‘unknowns’. These include the situation with AGs of Rwandan origin in DRC, the effect of conflict in Burundi and what the consequences of constitutional change in Rwanda prior to 2016 elections. These three elements are potential destabilisers with the potential to drive national and regional instability. In a situation where these potential destabilising factors are realised the outcomes of the project are likely to be greatly undermined.

265. As per the 2015 CDS, the picture for the reintegration of ex-combatants is remarkably positive whether perceived through the lens of economic performance or indicators of social inclusion, empowerment and happiness are considered. The CDS finds that ex-combatants and civilians enjoy parity across most economic and social indicators of reintegration with some exceptions, principally concerning: (i) the perception that ex-combatants can get preferential treatment in decisions affecting the wellbeing of the community and when interacting with government, (ii) the perception held by some ex-combatant youth and former child combatants that they are discriminated against on the basis of age and of being former combatant when seeking paid employment and in the workplace, and (iii) the consistently lower economic and social performance of disabled civilians when compared to disabled ex-combatants. However, as noted above and in the annexes there are issues of concern regarding the proportion of ex-combatants in acute deprivation.

### **3.8 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome**

266. The risk to development outcomes is rated **moderate**. Risk to development outcome has two key dimensions: (i) the likelihood that some changes may occur that will be detrimental to the achievement of the PDO, and (ii) the likely impact on the PDO if these changes materialize. Specifically, the risk to development outcome refers to risks that may be experienced by the project in the remainder of its life (in the case of the SEDRP, up until June 2016) and whether there are adequate arrangements in place to help avoid or mitigate the impact of uncertainties.

267. The risks to PDO for the SEDRP are all largely external to the project at country and regional level and emanating from the political economy of Rwanda and its neighbours. As such they are outside the remit of the project to manage.

268. At the time of evaluation the project has achieved one half of its PDO in the demobilisation of members of RDF. Regarding the other half of the PDO it continues to support the GoR to provide socio-economic reintegration support to ex-combatants who have demobilized recently (and not so recently in the case of on-going interventions with elderly,

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<sup>125</sup> GoR, 2014.

<sup>126</sup> MIFOTRA, 2014 (Correspondence).

disabled or unwell). As has been discussed the results for the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants are strong and drivers of destabilization such as poverty, stigma and inequality are unlikely to originate from within communities of return.

## **Annex 2. Documents Reviewed (all studies)**

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### **Annex 3. Consultations**

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Musonera Frank	Former Manager Mutobo Rehabilitation Centre
Bahati Kamuzizi	Child Protection Officer/ New Centre Manger (Motobo)
Rucyahana, Raphael	Coordinator Muhoza
Clemence Niyoritesi	Gender Mainstreaming
Rutazigwa, Louis	M&E Officer
Felicien Menyande	MIS Officer
George Tukesiga	Former MIS, now Resource Centre Development Officer
Musifula, Albert	Assistant Centre Manager, Mutobo
Gatete, Patrick	Repatriation Officer, Rubavu
Theogen Nkuruzinza	Engineer, RDRC Construction Unit
Grace Mugabe	Communications Officer
<b>Others</b>	
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Ms. Batete	MIGEPROF/gender office
Tharcien Yankurije	Director and Mainstreaming
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